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THE CRIMINALIZATION OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS
Steven Arrigg Koh*
Overcriminalization has rightly generated national condemnation among
policymakers, scholars, and practitioners alike. And yet, such scholarship
often assumes that the encroachment of criminal justice stops at our borders.
This Article argues that our foreign relations are also at risk of
overcriminalization due to overzealous prosecution, overreaching
legislation, and presidential politicization—and that this may be particularly
problematic when U.S. criminal justice supplants certain nonpenal U.S.
foreign policies abroad. This Article proposes three key reforms—
presidential distancing, prosecutorial integration, and legislative
de-escalation—to assure a principled place for criminal justice in foreign
relations.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary criminal legal scholars paint a grim picture of
overcriminalization. In their view, criminal justice has relentlessly expanded
in scope beyond its proper function, supplanting better forms of regulation.
Two forces propel this encroachment of criminal justice: overzealous
prosecutors and reflexively “tough on crime” legislators. Drug use, for
example, is treated as a crime-control issue instead of a health issue.1 As one
scholar has vividly noted, if each area of law were a different country,
criminal law would be an expansionist power that is shrinking neighboring
nations’ territories.2
And yet this robust body of scholarship tells a largely domestic story,
begging the question of whether criminal justice is similarly supplanting U.S.
policy options abroad. In other words, the question is whether and how the
1. See PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 71 (2017); DAVID GARLAND,
THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 90 (2001);
DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 58 (2008);
JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 17–18 (2007); Darryl K. Brown,
Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657,
657 (2011) (“Overcriminalization is the term that captures the normative claim that
governments create too many crimes and criminalize things that properly should not be
crimes.”); Ellen S. Podgor, The Dichotomy Between Overcriminalization and
Underregulation, 70 AM. U. L. REV. 1061, 1065 (2020) (“[I]n looking at overcriminalization,
one needs to look at two separate tiers of this issue: (1) the growing number of federal statutes
that allow for increased prosecutions; and (2) the increased discretion provided to prosecutors
in enforcement practices that results in heightened prosecution and incarceration.”); see also
Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to
Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 764 (2005); Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s
New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1205 n.86 (2015); Erik Luna, The
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 705–06 (2005); Stephen F. Smith,
Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537, 542, 576 (2012).
2. Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
1367, 1372 (2017).
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expansion of the U.S. criminal justice system—which operates through
investigation, prosecution, and incarceration—is growing in our foreign
relations. And, in doing so, whether it is supplanting our foreign policy,
which traditionally operates through six modalities: diplomacy, cooperation
and association agreements, trade, economic sanctions, military force, and
the use of foreign aid.3
To better grasp the criminalization of foreign relations, let us engage in
two analogous thought experiments: one traditionally domestic, the other
extraterritorial. First, consider the drug-related conduct mentioned earlier.
Should domestic drug use be considered a crime or, instead, a health policy
issue? And should domestic drug possession be criminalized, and, if so, in
what quantity? And what about more harmful conduct, such as drug
distribution and international drug trafficking? Are those criminal concerns
or health issues? Such questions tease out the line between the overlapping
regulatory regimes of criminal law and health policy, both of which bear on
health-related conduct.4 Second, consider the same question, but compare
the desirability of criminal prosecution alongside foreign policy, not health
policy. Take the example of corruption and foreign bribery. Which is the
best way to discourage corruption abroad: Host a summit of world leaders
to address the issue? Engage in rule of law development abroad? Provide
economic incentives for countries to reform? Pass criminal legislation such
as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act5 (FCPA)? Or, as prosecutors, zealously
interpret the FCPA to prosecute foreign citizens and foreign companies in
foreign countries, on the thin U.S. jurisdictional theory that the transactions
are denominated in U.S. dollars?6 Such questions probe our intuitions
regarding the proper normative place of criminal prosecution against other
foreign policy tools.
The time is ripe to pose such questions, as even a casual glance at U.S.
headlines today raises the question of the function that criminal justice should
play abroad and how the twin forces of overcriminalization are pressuring
that function. The United States is arresting Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou

3. See Clair Apodaca, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Tool, OXFORD RSCH.
ENCYCLOPEDIAS
(Apr.
26,
2017),
https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/
acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-332 [https://perma.cc/7YDF9F7Z].
4. Cf. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 24–27, 119–22 (2017).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77dd-1.
6. See Steven Arrigg Koh, Foreign Affairs Prosecutions, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 340, 388
(2019); see also Supreme Court Questions Whether Dollar-Denominated Transactions or
Other Financial Transactions in the U.S. Are Sufficient to Assert Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 8, 2018) [hereinafter FCPA PROFESSOR],
http://fcpaprofessor.com/supreme-court-questions-whether-dollar-denominated-transactionsfinancial-transactions-u-s-sufficient-assert-jurisdiction-foreign-corporations
[https://perma.cc/EWS8-Y436] (describing how several FCPA enforcement actions have
alleged jurisdiction because the transactions were denominated in U.S. dollars).
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abroad,7 while at home indicting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro,8
Mexican Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda,9 Russian hackers,10
and Chinese nationals alleged to have stolen COVID-19 vaccine research.11
Such cases exemplify what I have previously called “foreign affairs
prosecutions,” or U.S. criminal cases with some nexus to a foreign country.12
While such cases may arise due to the autonomous actions of a federal, state,
or local prosecutorial office, they may also be the product of U.S. policy
choices governing when and how to enforce criminal law outside of
American borders—this Article calls this U.S. extraterritorial law
enforcement policy “U.S. ELEP.”
This Article argues that the criminalization of foreign relations is occurring
and that, worryingly, our foreign relations may be on the verge of
overcriminalization due to a rise of U.S. ELEP. This Article contributes a
descriptive and normative account of U.S. criminal justice within the broader
framework of U.S. foreign relations and argues for presidential restraint in
such cases. This Article also marshals this transnational context to bolster
scholarship on normative theories of criminalization. This Article thus
contributes to the literature at the intersection of criminal law, foreign
relations law, and international law.
Criminal law scholars are largely critical of all aspects of contemporary
U.S. criminal justice, particularly policing and prisons.13 Foreign relations
law scholars, by contrast, generally see criminal justice as a more appealing
alternative to ad hoc prosecutions in Guantanamo Bay, drone strikes, or other

7. Julia Horowitz, Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou Arrested in Canada, Faces Extradition
to United States, CNN (Dec. 6, 2018, 11:58 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/
12/05/tech/huawei-cfo-arrested-canada/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q2UB-EN8F].
8. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Nicolás Maduro Moros and 14 Current and Former
Venezuelan Officials Charged with Narco-Terrorism, Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other
Criminal Charges (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nicol-s-maduro-morosand-14-current-and-former-venezuelan-officials-charged-narco-terrorism
[https://perma.cc/TEE9-XZNE].
9. See Steven Arrigg Koh, Criminalizing Foreign Relations: How the Biden
Administration Can Prevent a Global Arrest Game, JUST SEC. (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/73853/criminalizing-foreign-relations-how-the-bidenadministration-can-prevent-a-global-arrest-game/ [https://perma.cc/T5CX-LE5L]; see also
Azam Ahmed, Mexico’s Former Defense Minister Is Arrested in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/16/us/mexico-general-cienfuegosdea.html [ https://perma.cc/TBE2-6T46].
10. See Dustin Volz, U.S. Charges Six Russian Intelligence Officers with Hacking, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2020, 8:17 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-charges-six-russianintelligence-officers-with-hacking-11603126931 [https://perma.cc/F6HC-EMDD].
11. See Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Accuses Hackers of Trying to Steal Coronavirus Vaccine
Data for China, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/us/
politics/china-hacking-coronavirus-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/3WCH-8XFL].
12. See Michael Farbiarz, Accuracy and Adjudication: The Promise of Extraterritorial
Due Process, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2016); Koh, supra note 6.
13. See Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613,
1638–46 (2019). See generally BUTLER, supra note 1; Emma Kaufman, The Prisoner Trade,
133 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (2020).
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use of force.14 Meanwhile, international law scholars are largely sanguine
about the role of international criminal tribunals to promote accountability
for widespread violations of international human rights and humanitarian
law.15
This Article balances the realities of criminal justice against global foreign
policy imperatives. In so doing, this Article describes a reality, a promise,
and a fear. Part I describes the reality: we must apprehend the growth of
U.S. ELEP in foreign relations. Part I introduces this reality through two
case examples and considers the risk of outbreak of a “global arrest game.”
Part II then describes the promise:
two central characteristics—
distinctiveness and expressivism—should define the proper function of U.S.
ELEP in foreign relations. Part III underscores the fear: the twin forces
driving overcriminalization domestically—overzealous prosecution and
legislative overreach—are also doing so extraterritorially and, thus, threaten
the proper U.S. ELEP function. Part III also emphasizes a third causal factor,
specific to U.S. ELEP: direct presidential politicization under the foreign
affairs authority. Finally, Part IV prescribes three reforms: presidential
distancing, prosecutorial integration, and legislative de-escalation. The
former two regard the executive, clarifying the three-layered Department of
Justice (DOJ) roles of the president, agency leadership, and the individual
line prosecutor.
The latter addresses the remaining cause of
overcriminalization—legislative overreach—and considers how a richer
normative theory of criminalization could guide the political branches in the
development of U.S. ELEP.
Before doing so, a brief word to clarify terms. By “foreign relations,” I
mean all interaction between the U.S. government and foreign governments.
“Foreign policy” is any of six modalities that the U.S. government
traditionally deploys in foreign relations: diplomacy, cooperation and
association agreements, trade, economic sanctions, military force, and the
use of foreign aid (“six foreign policy modalities”).16 As noted above, U.S.
ELEP refers to the policy governing the development and use of foreign
affairs prosecutions. By the “criminalization of foreign relations,” I mean
descriptively the increasing use in foreign relations of U.S. ELEP over other
foreign policy modalities. And by “foreign relations overcriminalization,” I
mean the normatively undesirable overuse of U.S. ELEP over other foreign
policy modalities.

14. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 165 U. PENN. L. REV.
499 (2017); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case Against National Security Courts, 45 WILLIAMETTE
L. REV. 505 (2009).
15. See generally DIANE ORENTLICHER, SOME KIND OF JUSTICE: THE ICTY’S IMPACT IN
BOSNIA AND SERBIA (2018); Harold Hongju Koh, Address, International Criminal Justice 5.0,
38 YALE J. INT’L L. 525, 539–41 (2013); Milena Sterio, The International Criminal Court:
Current Challenges and Prospect of Future Success, 52 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 467, 467–
68 (2020). But see Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human
Rights, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1070 (2015).
16. See Apodaca, supra note 3, at 2.
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I. THE REALITY: THE RISE OF U.S. EXTRATERRITORIAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT
Our foreign relations are being criminalized.17 This part lays the
foundation for this argument by describing two case examples and then
17. The intersections between criminal justice and foreign policy are tremendously
variegated. The president of the United States may pressure another country’s foreign leader
to investigate and prosecute a case. See Julian E. Barnes et al., Trump Pressed Ukraine’s
Leader on Inquiry into Biden’s Son, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/09/20/us/politics/trump-whistle-blower-ukraine.html [https://perma.cc/DL4X-4FBA].
The United States may or may not extradite a U.S. or foreign national back to a country where
the national is alleged to have perpetrated a crime and in doing so trigger international
controversy. See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig et al., Giuliani Pressed Trump to Eject Muslim Cleric
from U.S., A Top Priority of Turkish President, Former Officials Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 15,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/giuliani-pressed-trump-to-eject-muslimcleric-from-us-a-top-priority-of-turkish-president-former-officials-say/2019/10/15/
bf43d1ec-ef68-11e9-b648-76bcf86eb67e_story.html
[https://perma.cc/M84M-53Y2]
(reporting that Rudolph Giuliani urged President Trump to comply with the Turkish
government’s requests to eject Fethullah Gülen, a permanent U.S. citizen, to stand trial in
Turkey for allegedly plotting a 2016 coup attempt against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan);
Kanishka Singh, U.S. Judge Orders Release of Peru Ex-President on Bail Due to Coronavirus
Outbreak, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2020, 1:04 AM), https://www.theguardian.pe.ca/news/
world/us-judge-orders-release-of-peru-ex-president-on-bail-due-to-coronavirus-outbreak427005/ [https://perma.cc/5TMW-LSHV] (discussing the pending extradition proceedings
against Alejandro Toledo, former Peruvian president, who was arrested in California in 2019
and faces serious corruption charges in Peru); Laurel Wamsley, Wife of U.S. Diplomat Flees
U.K. After Fatal Car Crash, Avoiding Police Investigation, NPR (Oct. 7, 2019, 1:58 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/07/767925703/wife-of-u-s-diplomat-flees-u-k-after-fatal-carcrash-avoiding-police-investigati [https://perma.cc/2JMJ-MYSX] (reporting that British
Prime Minister Boris Johnson condemned a U.S. citizen’s use of diplomatic immunity after
the individual, who is married to a U.S. diplomat, allegedly struck and killed a motorist with
her car in England); Michael Wilson, How a Death at a Caribbean Resort Became an
International Incident, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
11/21/nyregion/gavin-scott-hapgood-anguilla-manslaughter.html [https://perma.cc/BWL27AHY] (discussing the fallout after Scott Hapgood, a U.S. citizen, refused to attend a court
hearing in Anguilla concerning a physical altercation between Hapgood and an Anguilla hotel
worker that ended in the worker’s death). The United States may be seen as pressuring a
foreign criminal justice system to release a U.S. national detained or prosecuted abroad. See,
e.g., Bassem Mroue, Judge in Lebanon Appeals Order to Release Lebanese-American,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 17, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/new-hampshire/articles/2020-03-17/lebanese-judge-orders-retrial-of-lebaneseamerican [https://perma.cc/497S-XF4F] (describing how a military tribunal ordered the
release of Lebanese-American, Amer Fakhoury, who had been detained in Lebanon since
September 2019, to face charges of allegedly torturing prisoners while working for an Israeli
militia more than ten years ago). The United States may lead in the establishment of, or
actively thwart the work of, international criminal tribunals. See, e.g., Nahal Toosi & Natasha
Bertrand, Trump Authorizes Sanctions Against the International Criminal Court, POLITICO
(June 11, 2020, 9:59 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/11/white-houseinternational-criminal-court-sanctions-313070 [https://perma.cc/2LQ6-X69F]. See generally
Koh, supra note 15, at 539–41. U.S. political actors may or may not—in the case of Chinese
Uighurs, Iraqi Yazidis, or Ottoman Armenians—declare certain foreign conduct a genocide.
See Eldad Ben Aharon, Armenian Genocide: US Recognition of Turkey’s Killing of 1.5
Million Was Tangled Up in Decades of Geopolitics, CONVERSATION (Mar. 6, 2020, 8:01 AM),
https://theconversation.com/armenian-genocide-us-recognition-of-turkeys-killing-of-1-5million-was-tangled-up-in-decades-of-geopolitics-129159 [https://perma.cc/U5QF-YYP5];
Agence France-Presse, US Senators Seek to Declare Uighur ‘Genocide’ by China in
Bipartisan Push, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2020, 9:04 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
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considering the overall picture of U.S. ELEP in contemporary foreign
relations.
A. Two Cautionary Case Examples
1. Venezuela: The Indictment of President Nicolás Maduro
Venezuela’s government, led by President Nicolás Maduro Moros, has
faced national unrest in the wake of extreme economic turmoil and electoral
dysfunction over the last decade.18 In January 2019, President Donald J.
Trump recognized opposition leader and president of the National Assembly
of Venezuela, Juan Guaidó, as the interim president of Venezuela in the wake
of elections that the United States declared to be illegitimate.19 In his
statement, President Trump announced that he would “continue to use the
full weight of United States economic and diplomatic power to press for the
restoration of Venezuelan democracy.”20 Months later, he imposed new
sanctions on the regime.21
In the midst of this, U.S. ELEP emerged as another aspect of this foreign
relations story. In March 2020, the United States indicted President Maduro
in New York, Washington, D.C., and Miami for conspiring with Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) to facilitate a decades-long
narco-terrorism and international cocaine trafficking regime.22 Specifically,
the federal indictments charged Maduro with illegally importing hundreds of
tons of cocaine into the United States.23 Although the indictment of a
presumed head of state is unusual, President Trump justified it on the ground
2020/oct/28/us-senators-seek-to-declare-uighur-genocide-by-china-in-bipartisan-push
[https://perma.cc/ADH5-Q43Y]; U.S. Decries ISIS ‘Genocide’ of Christians, Other Groups,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2017, 1:10 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-decriesislamic-state-genocide-christians-other-groups-n792866 [https://perma.cc/E8GM-97DB]. Or
the criminal justice may constitute the foreign policy itself. As the case of Hong Kong showed,
President Trump ended the “special” relationship with Hong Kong—including its law
enforcement relationship, which involved extradition—in light of Chinese encroachment on
Hong Kong’s independent legal system. See Michael Crowley et al., Rebuking China, Trump
Curtails Ties to Hong Kong and Severs Them with W.H.O., N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/us/politics/trump-hong-kong-china-WHO.html
[https://perma.cc/KPL2-RN9Q]. While such procedural permutations vary, the overall trends
are the same: a globalized world in which criminal justice helps or hinders relations between
states.
18. See Venezuela Crisis: How the Political Situation Escalated, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36319877 [https://perma.cc/GN42A84J].
19. See Press Release, Statement Announcing United States Recognition of National
Assembly President Juan Gerardo Guaidó Márquez as Interim President of Venezuela
(Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201900046/pdf/DCPD201900046.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ38-VULZ].
20. Id.
21. See Michael Crowley & Anatoly Kurmanaev, Trump Imposes New Sanctions on
Venezuela, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/
us/politics/venezuela-embargo-sanctions.html [https://perma.cc/2WNH-GVSF].
22. See Press Release, supra note 8.
23. See id.
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that Maduro is “an illegitimate ruler” and “a tyrant who brutalizes his people”
and promised that Maduro’s “grip on tyranny will be smashed and broken.”24
Then, just months later, government officials in Cabo Verde detained Alex
Nain Saab Morán, a Colombian businessman and key dealmaker for
Maduro’s regime in Venezuela.25 U.S. authorities indicted Saab on money
laundering charges, alleging that Saab had funneled more than $350 million
to offshore accounts and disguised the transaction as a program for helping
starving Venezuelans.26 On June 29, 2020, the United States formally
requested the extradition of Saab, despite the fact that no extradition treaty
exists between the United States and Cabo Verde.27
What role is criminal justice playing here? Some commentators believe
that indictments were an integral part of the Trump administration’s
“maximum pressure” campaign to cabin Maduro, a campaign that includes
the aforementioned sanctions and political recognition of Guaidó.28 By
contrast, others believe this case to be a natural consequence of years of
investigation, which began during the Obama administration.29
24. William K. Rashbaum et al., Venezuelan Leader Maduro Is Charged in the U.S. with
Drug Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/
26/nyregion/venezuela-president-drug-trafficking-nicolas-maduro.html
[https://perma.cc/2NXM-VQRY]. Despite these accusations, President Trump announced in
June that he would consider meeting with Maduro, though he later appeared to walk back his
comments. See Anne Gearan et al., Trump Backtracks on a Meeting with Venezuela’s Maduro
after Chorus of Criticism, WASH. POST (June 22, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/trump-backtracks-on-a-meeting-with-venezuelas-maduro-after-chorus-ofcriticism/2020/06/22/8f25d598-b491-11ea-aca5-ebb63d27e1ff_story.html
[https://perma.cc/JY7N-HDDC]. Maduro has disparaged the charges, accusing the United
States and Colombia of inciting more violence in Venezuela and has taken retaliatory steps by
seeking the extradition of Jordan Goudreau, who helped organize the failed incursion of
Venezuela, from the United States. See Brian Ellsworth, Venezuela’s Maduro to Seek U.S.
Extradition of Security Contractor, REUTERS (May 6, 2020, 2:21 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-security-extradition/venezuelas-maduro-toseek-u-s-extradition-of-security-contractor-idUSKBN22I2TH
[https://perma.cc/89SWB4MP].
25. Patricia Laya, Maduro’s U.S.-Charged Dealmaker Alex Saab Detained in Cabo
Verde, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 13, 2020), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/maduro-s-u-scharged-dealmaker-alex-saab-detained-in-cabo-verde-1.1449942
[https://perma.cc/97UXQRAH].
26. See Michael Smith & Ethan Bronner, U.S. Seeks Extradition of Maduro’s Alleged
Dealmaker Alex Saab, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 29, 2020), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/us-seeks-extradition-of-maduro-s-alleged-dealmaker-alex-saab-1.1458171
[https://perma.cc/4TCP-B4EM].
27. Id.; Cape Verde May Send Suspect to US Without Extradition Treaty, ABC NEWS
(June 15, 2020, 9:02 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/cape-verde-sendsuspect-us-extradition-treaty-71254504 [https://perma.cc/H2M3-9MRH].
28. Anthony Faiola et al., U.S. Indicts Venezuela’s Maduro on Narcoterrorism Charges,
Offers $15 Million Reward for His Capture, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/the-united-states-indicts-venezuelasmaduro-on-narco-terrorism-charges/2020/03/26/a5a64122-6f68-11ea-a1560048b62cdb51_story.html [https://perma.cc/8CZH-Y9N3].
29. It is certainly plausible that U.S. officials are correct when they state that the timing
and nature of the charges (namely, narcoterrorism, corruption, and drug trafficking) had more
to do with the DOJ’s investigations—specifically, the timing of grand juries weighing the
matter in New York and Florida—than any change of position within the administration.
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2. China: The China Initiative and Case of Meng Wanzhou
The twenty-first century geopolitical dynamic between the United States
and China presents another helpful illustration of foreign relations
criminalization. Over the last one hundred years, geopolitics evolved from a
multipolar world to—in the wake of the Cold War—an era of American
global hegemony.30 Now, China’s rise ensures that the twenty-first century
will be a largely bipolar world, balanced between the world’s two largest
economies.31 The U.S. government thus manages this critical relationship
by deploying all six foreign policy modalities, each heavily discussed in
popular and academic commentary.32
In particular, the Trump
administration leaned more heavily on trade tariffs to manage the relationship
between the United States and China.33
However, in recent years, an additional force has emerged in U.S.-China
relations: criminal justice. In 2018, under Attorney General Jeff Sessions,
the DOJ launched a “China Initiative,” designed to “reflect[] the strategic
priority of countering Chinese national security threats and reinforce[] the
President’s overall national security strategy.” 34 The head of the DOJ
National Security Division spearheads this group, which is also run by
various U.S. Attorneys around the country.35 The multifaceted initiative
emphasizes trade secret theft cases and involves proactive information
sharing and threat identification with individual U.S. Attorneys offices.36
Since 2018, there have been eighty-four prosecutions.37
To illustrate the function of U.S. ELEP in U.S.-China relations, consider
the ongoing criminal case of Meng Wanzhou, the CFO of the Chinese
telecommunications technology company Huawei.38
The press has
described the Meng case as an “earthquake moment in US-China ties” and
Federal criminal investigations, especially large cross-border investigations, take many years
to develop; thus, the investigations could have begun during the Obama administration. For
example, the charges in this case were “‘a decade’ in the making.” Id.
30. See The Chinese Century Is Well Under Way, ECONOMIST (Oct. 27, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/10/27/the-chinese-century-is-well-underway [https://perma.cc/S2GG-69FS].
31. See id.
32. See generally HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA (2011); THOMAS J. WRIGHT, ALL
MEASURES SHORT OF WAR: THE CONTEST FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN POWER (2017).
33. See Ana Swanson & Alan Rappeport, Trump Signs China Trade Deal, Putting
Economic Conflict on Pause, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
01/15/business/economy/china-trade-deal.html [https://perma.cc/H2ZX-YS6M].
34. See Information About the Department of Justice’s China Initiative and a Compilation
of China-Related Prosecutions Since 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (June 14, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-andcompilation-china-related [https://perma.cc/46KD-J582].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Ian Young, Canadian Ruling That Could Set Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou Free Is
Complicated by Coronavirus Pandemic, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 27, 2020, 11:09 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3081820/canadian-ruling-could-sethuawei-executive-meng-wanzhou-free [https://perma.cc/7P8P-FHDN].
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one sending “Canada’s relationship with Beijing plummeting to new
depths.”39 In particular, the Meng case has added greater fuel to the fire of
the yearslong U.S. pressure campaign on Huawei and its 5G network.
Huawei’s 5G network is widely seen as the next chapter in mobile
technology—one that forecasters expect China to lead and that President
Trump aimed to curtail globally during his presidency.40
First, the Meng case exemplifies lawful domestic U.S. law enforcement
investigation and indictment. On January 28, 2019, the U.S. Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York indicted Meng on fraud charges related to
violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran.41 The indictment charged that Meng
and other Huawei employees misrepresented Huawei’s relationship with
Skycom—an Iranian subsidiary—and falsely claimed that Huawei had only
limited operations in Iran.42 In late 2018, the United States then proceeded

39. Id.
40. America Does Not Want China to Dominate 5G Mobile Networks, ECONOMIST (Apr.
8, 2020), https://www.economist.com/business/2020/04/08/america-does-not-want-china-todominate-5g-mobile-networks [https://perma.cc/APF7-EVJZ]. In 2012, Congress issued a
report that warned of Huawei’s relationship with the Chinese Communist Party and provided
“credible evidence” that the company failed to comply with U.S. laws.
See MIKE ROGERS & DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE: A
REPORT at 12 (2012), https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:rm226yb7473/HuaweiZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf [https://perma.cc/H7BW-G52K]. Then,
in 2018, the Pentagon banned sales of Huawei phones on U.S. military bases. Stu Woo &
Gordon Lubold, Pentagon Orders Stores on Military Bases to Remove Huawei, ZTE Phones,
WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2018, 8:16 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pentagon-askingmilitary-bases-to-remove-huawei-zte-phones-1525262076 [https://perma.cc/4BAD-Z46B].
41. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate
Huawei and Huawei CFO Wanzhou Meng Charged with Financial Fraud (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-andhuawei-cfo-wanzhou-meng-charged-financial [https://perma.cc/KKH3-GPUL]. The United
States codified bank fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and obstruction of justice as crimes
in 1984, 1952, 1986, and 1982, respectively. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343–1344, 1956, 1512(c).
Further, in 1977, the United States passed the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
which empowers the president to address unusual and extraordinary threats to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. See 50 U.S.C. § 170l(a).
42. See Superseding Indictment at 5–8, United States v. Huawei Tech. Co., No. 18-cr-457
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2019). According to the indictment, Huawei represented to both its global
banking partners and U.S. officials that it had sold its interests in Skycom in 2007 and that
Skycom was merely Huawei’s local Iranian business partner. Id. Instead, Huawei allegedly
controlled Skycom, and Meng sat on its board of directors. Id. The indictment further alleged
that Meng and other Huawei representatives attempted to obstruct the U.S. government’s
investigation by destroying and concealing evidence and by relocating several U.S.-based
Huawei employees with knowledge of the company’s Iranian operations to China. Id.
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to request that Canada arrest Meng in Vancouver, where she resided at the
time.43 Meng’s formal extradition proceedings began in January 2020.44
Second, the Meng case sparked condemnation from the Chinese
government, leading to retaliatory prosecutorial and foreign policy measures.
In response to the indictment, Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, called the
charges “a serious mistake” and “urge[d] the U.S. to immediately correct its
mistake.”45 Meanwhile, Canada maintained that its courts “would make
decisions based purely on legal considerations and not on politics.”46 China
responded by punishing Canada, and not the United States, by arresting two
Canadians: Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor.47 In December 2018,
43. See Jacqueline Thomsen & Olivia Beavers, US Files Criminal Charges Against
Chinese Firm Huawei, HILL (Jan. 28, 2019, 4:46 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/
cybersecurity/427325-us-announces-criminal-charges-against-chinas-huawei
[https://perma.cc/TUE9-H835]. At some point prior to Meng’s arrest, the United States
requested that Canada provisionally arrest Meng. See Press Release, supra note 41. In doing
so, U.S. officials provided required information—such as a description of the person sought
and a statement of the existence of a warrant—under the U.S.-Canada extradition treaty in
cases of emergency. See Treaty on Extradition Between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the United States of America, Can.-U.S., art. 11, Dec. 3, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 983.
In 1971, the United States entered into its first bilateral treaty with Canada; the most recent
Canada-U.S. extradition treaty entered into force in 2003. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 at 205; Treaty on
Extradition Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of
America, supra; Second Protocol Amending the Treaty on Extradition, Can.-U.S., Jan. 12,
2001, T.I.A.S. No. 107-11. In December 2018, Canadian law enforcement arrested Meng. See
In a Row Between China and America, Canada Gets Trampled, ECONOMIST (Dec. 22, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/12/22/in-a-row-between-china-and-americacanada-gets-trampled [https://perma.cc/Y3EL-JCHD] [hereinafter In a Row Between China
and America]. In late January 2019, the United States formally requested Meng’s extradition
from Canada, within forty-five days, as required by the Canada-U.S. extradition treaty. See
Michael Burke, US Formally Requests Extradition of Huawei Executive from Canada, HILL
(Jan. 29, 2019, 6:55 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/427564-us-formally-requestsextradition-of-huawei-executive-from-canada [https://perma.cc/MC3N-WHMT]; Treaty on
Extradition Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of
America, supra, art. 9–11 (listing the requirements for a full extradition request, including a
description of the person sought, a statement of the facts of the case, the text of the relevant
laws, and an arrest warrant). Further, in late January 2019, two separate grand juries in the
United States returned indictments against Huawei affiliates, subsidiaries, and executives.
Thomsen & Beavers, supra.
44. Ian Young, Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou Back in Canadian Court for First Time Since
Reports About Talks to Let Her Go Home to China, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 8, 2020,
2:34 AM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3112949/huaweis-mengwanzhou-back-canadian-court-first-time-reports [https://perma.cc/T3YM-27WH].
On
December 8, 2020, Meng appeared in Canadian court for the first time in months to hear
testimony from witnesses involved in her arrest back in 2018. Id.
45. Edward Wong et al., U.S. Will Ask Canada to Extradite Huawei Executive, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
22,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/us/politics/meng-wanzhouextradition.html [https://perma.cc/YS9S-6AGT].
46. Id. Canadian foreign minister Chrystia Freeland “stressed [this] approach after Mr.
Trump told Reuters in an interview in December that he could stop the extradition of Ms.
Meng if China offered sufficient concessions in continuing negotiations aimed at ending a
costly trade war between the United States and China.” Id.
47. Id. Such retaliatory arrest has occurred at least once before. See Dan Levin, Couple
Held in China Are Free, but ‘Even Now We Live Under a Cloud,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2017),

748

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

China arrested Kovrig, a diplomat, and Spavor, a Canadian businessman,
citing national security concerns, and China is currently detaining the two
under harsh living conditions.48 Then, just days later, a Chinese court
sentenced a Canadian, Robert Lloyd Schellenberg, to death in an unrelated
drug smuggling case.49 The sentence came after a one-day retrial on drug
smuggling charges.50 Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau reacted by
declaring that China had “arbitrarily appl[ied the] death penalty.”51 The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China denied that the
arrests of Kovrig or Spavor, or Schellenberg’s sentencing, were related to
Meng’s arrest.52 As this process unfolded, so did the mutual public
recriminations between Canada and China. Prime Minister Trudeau asked
for the resignation of John McCallum, the Canadian ambassador to China,
on January 27, 2019, after McCallum expressed his belief that it would be
“great for Canada” if the United States dropped its extradition request.53
Furthermore, in response to Meng Wanzhou’s arrest, China described the
charges against Meng as “politically motivated.”54 The Meng case was
complicated by repeated assertions then-President Trump made that
“criminal charges against Chinese telecom giant Huawei and [Meng] could
be used as a bargaining chip in his administration’s ongoing trade

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/01/world/canada/canadian-couple-china-detention.html
[https://perma.cc/NSC7-W28P].
48. Javier C. Hernández & Dan Bilefsky, For Canadians Held in China, Two Years of
Isolation and Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
12/09/world/asia/china-canada-michael-kovrig-spavor.html [https://perma.cc/77QS-K35U];
see also In a Row Between China and America, supra note 43 (“According to a person familiar
with the situation, Mr. Kovrig is being questioned ‘morning, afternoon and evening’ and is
not allowed to turn the lights off when he sleeps.”). As will be discussed further in Part II,
then-President Trump further politicized the arrest, saying that he “would intervene in the
Meng case if . . . ‘it’s good for the country,’” specifically referring to a potential trade deal
with China. Interactive Timeline: The Extradition Case of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, BUS.
IN
VANCOUVER
(Apr.
13,
2020,
1:19
PM),
https://biv.com/article/2020/
04/interactive-timeline-extradition-case-huawei-cfo-meng-wanzhou [https://perma.cc/5LRBH4RV].
49. Chris Buckley, China Sentences a Canadian, Robert Lloyd Schellenberg, to Death,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/world/asia/china-canadaschellenberg-retrial.html [https://perma.cc/LBF6-VS66].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. Canada intends to intercede in the case as the decision is pending examination and
ratification by China’s highest court. Id.
53. Trudeau Fires Canada’s Ambassador to China amid Huawei Controversy,
BBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47015700
[https://perma.cc/E6KR-BB22]. Prime Minister Trudeau’s comments followed his earlier
remarks “that Meng had some ‘strong arguments’ for avoiding extradition to the US and that
Meng’s extradition ‘would not be a happy outcome.’” Isobel Asher Hamilton, Canada Fired
Its Chinese Ambassador After His ‘Mind-Boggling’ Remarks on the Arrest of Huawei’s CFO,
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2019, 6:27 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/justin-trudeaufired-china-ambassador-over-comments-about-meng-wanzhou-2019-1
[https://perma.cc/7XEZ-7Z7W].
54. See Hamilton, supra note 53.
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negotiations with China,”55 contravening warnings from his staff about the
ramifications of politicizing the case.56 Meanwhile, academics, diplomats,
and policymakers have been deeply critical of China’s behavior in these
cases. In late January 2019, over one hundred such individuals signed an
open letter calling for the release of Kovrig and Spavor.57 In June 2020,
China indicted the two on espionage charges; in August 2021, Spavor was
convicted and sentenced to eleven years in prison.58 Finally, just before
publication of this Article, DOJ announced that it had entered into a deferred
prosecution with Meng in which she admitted to engaging in the alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations. This event sent into effect a rapid chain of
de-escalation in September 2021: the United States agreed to withdraw its
extradition request from Canada; Meng returned to China; and China
returned Spavor and Kovrig to Canada, where they were personally greeted
at the airport by Prime Minister Trudeau.59
Third, and finally, while the acute multilateral tension of the Meng case
has subsided, its aftershocks are now folded into the broader, complex
foreign relations between the United States, China, and Canada. Canadian
unfavorable perceptions of China are near historic highs, influenced in part
by the Meng events and also by COVID-19.60 Meanwhile, Chinese state
media barely covered the release of Spavor and Kovrig, leaving the
impression on the Chinese public that Beijing gave nothing away for their
55. Steven Overly, Trump Says Huawei Charges on the Table in China Trade Talks,
POLITICO (Feb. 22, 2019, 6:43 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/22/trumphuawei-china-trade-talks-1206627 [https://perma.cc/69DG-WY5P]. Meng’s lawyers have
recently used such arguments in Canadian court to challenge her extraditability. See Ian
Young, Huawei Executive’s Extradition Is No “Garden-Variety” Case Because of Donald
Trump, Her Lawyer Says, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 1, 2020, 12:11 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3103763/huawei-executives-extraditionno-garden-variety-case-because [https://perma.cc/V8L5-KFKV].
56. See Horowitz, supra note 7.
57. Mr. Xi, Release These Two Canadian Citizens, GLOBE & MAIL (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-mr-xi-release-these-two-canadiancitizens/ [https://perma.cc/2PWL-QBXX]. The signatories claimed China’s retaliatory
detentions would have a chilling effect on the flow of ideas with Chinese academics and
officials. Id. The letter was signed by two former American ambassadors to Beijing, as well
as six former Canadian ambassadors to Beijing, among others. Id.
58. Javier C. Hernández & Catherine Porter, China Indicts 2 Canadians on Spying
Charges, Escalating Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/
19/world/asia/china-canada-kovrig-spavor.html [https://perma.cc/3YKL-AVFE]; Suranjana
Tewari, Michael Spavor: Canadian Jailed for 11 Years in China on Spying Charges, BBC
(Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58168587 [https://perma.cc/
4CSG-RA5E].
59. David E. Sanger et al., U.S. Agrees to Release Huawei Executive in Case That Strained
Ties with China, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/
24/us/politics/huawei-meng-wanzhou.html
[https://perma.cc/KDH6-PUQE];
Aruna
Viswanatha et al., Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou Reaches Deal with Justice Department,
WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2021, 7:15 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-departmentreaches-deal-with-huawei-executive-11632494001 [https://perma.cc/G4CY-V5GW].
60. Laura Silver, Large Majorities Say China Does Not Respect the Personal Freedoms
of Its People, PEW. RSCH. CTR. (June 30, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/
2021/06/30/large-majorities-say-china-does-not-respect-the-personal-freedoms-of-itspeople/ [https://perma.cc/5QAA-3D3M].
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release.61 And in America, the China Initiative is ongoing, thus aggravating
bilateral relations. The most recent development in the China Initiative was
the arrest of multiple Chinese scholars in the United States. In August 2020,
Chinese researcher Juan Tang pled not guilty after being indicted in the
Northern District of California on visa fraud charges; the case is one of
twenty-five in which Chinese researchers in the United States are alleged to
have ties to the Chinese military.62 In response to such DOJ prosecutions of
Chinese military-affiliated scholars, in October 2020, China warned that it
may begin detaining U.S. nationals in China.63 Just a month earlier, the U.S.
Department of State (“State Department”) issued a travel advisory
recommending that Americans avoid visiting China in part because the
Chinese government detains foreign nationals “to gain bargaining leverage
over foreign governments.”64 In January 2021, a joint letter signed by
groups, including the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law, called for the Biden administration to end the China
Initiative.65
The Meng case and China Initiative present similar questions as those
presented by the Maduro case: How did this case come about? What role
should criminal justice play in U.S.-China relations and in U.S. foreign
relations more generally? To what degree is the White House directing U.S.
ELEP and individual foreign affairs prosecutions,66 and is that problematic?
How are prosecutors and legislators fostering this criminalization? This
Article will address these questions in turn.

61. Chris Buckley & Katie Brenner, To Get Back Arrested Executive, China Uses a
Hardball Tactic: Seizing Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/09/25/world/asia/meng-wanzhou-china.html [https://perma.cc/4R6W-9YNC].
62. See, e.g., Clare Roth, Chinese Researcher Who Hid in U.S. Consulate Pleads Not
Guilty, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2020, 5:36 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2020-08-10/chinese-researcher-who-hid-in-u-s-consulate-pleads-not-guilty
[https://perma.cc/35JT-SXB7].
63. Kate O’Keeffe & Aruna Viswanatha, China Warns U.S. It May Detain Americans in
Response to Prosecutions of Chinese Scholars, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2020, 3:37 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-warns-u-s-it-may-detain-americans-in-response-toprosecutions-of-chinese-scholars-11602960959 [https://perma.cc/84N6-N6AY].
64. David Shepardson & Andrea Shalal, China Warns U.S. It May Detain Americans Over
Prosecutions: WSJ, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2020, 6:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-china/china-warns-u-s-it-may-detain-americans-over-prosecutions-wsjidUSKBN2720XL [https://perma.cc/4YWN-2SU7].
65. Elizabeth Redden, Groups Call on Biden to End DOJ ‘China Initiative,’ INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2021/01/06/groupscall-biden-end-doj-‘china-initiative’ [https://perma.cc/498N-A8XA].
66. This Article uses “White House” and “president” interchangeably. Both mean the
Office of the President itself, as opposed to other parts of the executive branch—especially
the DOJ. As will be discussed, there is a well-known debate as to how “unitary” the executive
branch is and should be. See infra note 199 and accompanying text. For present purposes, as
a descriptive matter, this Article distinguishes between the White House and the DOJ
regarding their knowledge of criminal cases and decision-making regarding such cases.
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B. The Setting and Stakes of U.S. Extraterritorial Law Enforcement
The Maduro and Meng cases exemplify the rise of contemporary U.S.
ELEP in our foreign relations. Such rise risks the outbreak of a global arrest
game.
1. Criminal Justice in Foreign Relations
As I have demonstrated previously, while it is difficult to precisely
quantify, foreign affairs prosecutions have risen dramatically in recent
decades.67 In previous eras, for example, criminal investigations across
borders were slow due to the snail-like pace of letters rogatory; today, it is
hastened by the post-1970s advent of mutual legal assistance and the
post-2018 creation of rapid electronic information sharing.68 Similarly,
whereas arrest and extradition of fugitives used to be slower and more time
consuming, today it is hastened by the global INTERPOL Red Notice
system, which creates a global network of apprehension for individuals who

67. While no scholar has ever undertaken a systematic historical study of the intersection
between criminal justice and foreign policy, the two have long made for uneasy bedfellows.
The Framers had relatively little to say about the substance or role of the federal government
in criminal justice or foreign relations matters, but prosecution has complicated foreign
relations since even before our nation’s founding and, certainly, since that time. Compare
RICHMAN ET AL., DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES 23 (2d ed. 2018) (“While the Bill of Rights gave
considerable attention to the procedural safeguards that would apply in federal prosecutions,
the range of prosecutions envisioned was thus quite small, and few were brought.”), with
CURTIS A. BRADLEY ET AL., FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 22 (7th ed.
2020) (noting that “constitutional text” may be “silent about the locus of a foreign relations
power”), and HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67 (1990) (“One cannot read the Constitution
without being struck by its astonishing brevity regarding the allocation of foreign affairs
authority among the branches.”). For example, the 1770 Boston Massacre trials of British
soldiers were a lightning rod for revolutionary sentiment just before the American Revolution,
while the Amistad trials in the 1840s engulfed the United States, Portugal, Britain, and Spain
in contentious debates about the international slave trade. See generally DAN ABRAMS &
DAVID FISHER, JOHN ADAMS UNDER FIRE: THE FOUNDING FATHER’S FIGHT FOR JUSTICE IN THE
BOSTON MASSACRE MURDER TRIAL (2020); Amistad Case, HIST. (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.history.com/topics/abolitionist-movement/amistad-case [https://perma.cc/8SN3ELM2]. The twentieth century abounded with examples as well, particularly involving
espionage cases during World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. These espionage cases
included the prosecution of eight Nazi saboteurs in 1942, the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg
espionage trial at the height of McCarthyism in 1951, and the Imelda Marcos trial in 1988.
See, e.g., Black Tom 1916 Bombing, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/black-tom-1916-bombing
[https://perma.cc/VE8R-785C] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (describing how German agents
destroyed two million tons of war materials in a bid to prevent U.S. shippers from supplying
English forces, thereby provoking the United States to declare war on Germany). Following
the Black Tom Bombing of 1916, Congress passed the Espionage Act, which outlawed
numerous crimes associated with German agents. Id.
68. See Peter Swire & Justin D. Hemmings, Mutual Legal Assistance in an Era of
Globalized Communications: The Analogy to the Visa Waiver Program, 71 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 687, 691–703 (2016); see also Steven Arrigg Koh, Core Criminal Procedure,
105 MINN. L. REV. 251, 268–70 (2020) (reviewing the CLOUD Act legislation and
considering its potential for cross-border criminal procedure).
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themselves are readily traveling via airplane.69 This trend is generalizable
across many facets of U.S. criminal justice today. Since the 1970s, a growing
transnational system of statutes, bilateral and multilateral treaties, and
institutional capacity has facilitated cooperation between countries with
mutual interest in enforcing their criminal laws.70 Legislatively, the United
States has, with each successive decade, passed more federal statutes
proscribing extraterritorial conduct and, recently, extraterritorial
amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.71 And the DOJ has
otherwise built out its international and national security infrastructure. In
particular, post-9/11, U.S. law enforcement agencies have pushed toward
global investigation, including strengthening the presence abroad of federal
law enforcement “attachés”—agents embedded in U.S. embassies abroad
who are tasked with advancing the law enforcement mandates of their
respective agencies.72 The sum total of such changes means that our foreign
relations have become more criminalized; in other words, criminal justice
69. See
Red
Notices,
INTERPOL,
https://www.interpol.int/en/How-wework/Notices/Red-Notices [https://perma.cc/YHN7-36RY] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
70. For example, Kevin Davis has described the OECD Paradigm of regulating
transnational bribery as one wherein “every little bit helps.” KEVIN E. DAVIS, BETWEEN
IMPUNITY AND IMPERIALISM 5 (2019). Critical questions defining regulation regard: (1) the
targeted conduct, (2) the complicit actors, (3) the sanctions imposed, and (4) the benefits and
burdens of imposing such sanctions. See id. at 5–6, 43–44 (describing the patchwork of
multilateral treaties and regional enforcement mechanisms that regulate corruption). While
the system is not perfect—in particular, with some inevitable risk to defendant interests and
foreign policy—it provides accountability for serious crimes by providing a lawful basis for
investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of individuals in cases with some nexus to a
foreign country. See generally Koh, supra note 6, at 352–53.
71. Koh, supra note 6, at 359. Such changes often occur after the DOJ has called for
them. Id.
72. The growth in federal law enforcement abroad began in earnest in the 1970s, in
response to issues like the development of the transnational drug trade in the 1960s and 1970s.
KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 158–61 (2009). By 1995, about 1600 law enforcement
personnel were operating abroad. Id. at 161. Though the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
has had an international presence since World War II, the 1990s witnessed a true globalization
of the FBI: between 1993 and 2001, the FBI’s offices in U.S. embassies abroad doubled, with
offices opening in locations such as Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, South Korea, and
Saudi Arabia. International Operations, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/international-operations
[https://perma.cc/5JY4-9QC7] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). Currently, the FBI has more than
250 special agents and other staff in over sixty overseas offices. Id. The core mission of these
attachés includes the advancement of international FBI investigations through established
liaison and exchange of information with foreign law enforcement and intelligence and
security services. See Thomas V. Fuentes, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Border,
Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism House Homeland Security Committee, FED. BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 4, 2007), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-fbi2019s-legalattache-program [https://perma.cc/6L8X-YS8X]; FBI Information Sharing and Safeguarding
Report
2012,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/statsservices/publications/national-information-sharing-strategy-1/fbi-information-sharing-andsafeguarding-report-2012-2 [https://perma.cc/SC4W-YJR9] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). FBI
attachés’ duties include coordinating requests for FBI or host country assistance overseas,
conducting investigations in coordination with the host government, and sharing investigative
leads and information. See Fuentes, supra.

2021]

THE CRIMINALIZATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

753

presents itself as a modality of U.S. global power in a way previously
unavailable, by historical standards. This growth of foreign affairs
prosecutions capability has given rise to the prospect of U.S. ELEP as a
foreign relations tool. In other words, along with the six foreign policy
modalities, the United States can invoke a seventh: its extraterritorial
criminal authority.
The criminalization of foreign relations creates a precarious dynamic for
contemporary U.S. law enforcement and, thus, a need for greater scholarly
attention on how U.S. ELEP functions in our foreign relations. Until now,
scholars exploring the various substantive aspects of this phenomenon have
considered the fight against corruption through the FCPA,73 prosecution of
foreign corporations,74 and the prosecution of banks.75 Others have
considered procedural aspects, such as the contours of personal jurisdiction76
or the applicability of criminal procedural rights.77 And scholarship on
foreign affairs prosecutions has focused largely on the individual case,
particularly on defendant rights and on how such cases differ procedurally
from traditional U.S. criminal cases.78
This Article builds on this scholarship in three ways. First, it more
explicitly links U.S. ELEP to domestic criminalization and crime control.
Second, it shifts the analysis from an exclusively criminal legal posture to
contextualizing U.S. ELEP as an alternative mode of U.S. global power and
one that is potentially supplanting foreign policy.79 Previous scholarship on
foreign affairs prosecutions has focused primarily on issues within the United
States, such as judicial deference, only lightly touching on the rich global
question of whether the United States “might . . . be ‘criminalizing’ foreign
policy,” and the function such cases may play in U.S. foreign relations.80
Finally, this Article ties together various scholarship with a more discrete
focus, addressing one substantive offense (e.g., FCPA), one category of

73. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 70, at 37–38.
74. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE
WITH CORPORATIONS 218–49 (2016) (reviewing prosecution of foreign corporations).
75. See, e.g., PIERRE-HUGUES VERDIER, GLOBAL BANKS ON TRIAL: U.S. PROSECUTIONS
AND THE REMAKING OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 2 (2020).
76. See, e.g., Farbiarz, supra note 12, at 627.
77. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 68, at 257.
78. See generally Farbiarz, supra note 12; Koh, supra note 6.
79. At the international level, some worry about the criminalization of transitional justice
and human rights. See, e.g., Engle, supra note 15, at 1119–27 (questioning the criminal turn
in the human rights movement).
80. See Koh, supra note 6, at 391. Previously, I briefly considered the foreign policy
implications of foreign affairs prosecutions. See id. For a brief discussion of the policy
implications of U.S. criminal cases with a foreign nexus, see id. at 385–90 (considering
domestic criminal cases and asking how the U.S. criminal justice system is becoming more
internationalized). This Article, by contrast, takes a global approach, asking how the entire
network of U.S. ELEP squares with the U.S. administration of foreign relations, the distinctive
and expressive function U.S. ELEP plays in such broader policy, and how politicization and
overcriminalization threaten such function.
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defendant (e.g., banks), or one aspect of transnational criminal legal process
(e.g., jurisdiction).81
Cumulatively, then, the broad paradigm of extraterritorial policing and
regulation in the postwar era constitutes an “overlooked” aspect of American
global power.82 In particular, commentators have systematically addressed
neither the normative question—what role U.S. ELEP should play abroad
given the other foreign policy options of U.S. global power—nor the causal
question—what forces propel the expansion of U.S. ELEP in U.S. foreign
relations? This Article answers both questions in Parts II and III.
2. The Global Arrest Game
What are the stakes of foreign relations criminalization? The central
specter is the possibility of a global arrest game, in which countries
worldwide engage in retaliatory arrest and/or extrajudicial killing. Indeed,
countries are often intertwined with their domestic corporations and
nationals, leading to various collateral consequences when U.S. criminal
justice impacts one or both.83 The global arrest game is particularly a risk
given that the United States is currently at the forefront of extraterritorial
investigation and prosecution84—it remains to be seen how and whether
other countries will develop in this regard.
At the same time, such countries may also engage in one or more of the
six foreign policy modalities. Turkey is a helpful example here. While
Turkey is party to a bilateral extradition treaty with the United States,85 the
United States turned down requests for the extradition of Fetullah Gülen—
the Turkish cleric residing in Pennsylvania who allegedly orchestrated the
failed 2016 Turkish coup attempt—on the ground that the Turkish
government had failed to present evidence supported by probable cause that
Gülen orchestrated the attacks.86 The Turkish government then explored
with Michael Flynn and, likely, Rudolph Giuliani, the possibility of
kidnapping Gülen.87 In addition to these tactics, Turkish authorities have
81. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 70; GARRETT, supra note 74, at 218–49 (reviewing
prosecution of foreign corporations); VERDIER, supra note 75.
82. RAUSTIALA, supra note 72, at 180.
83. DAVIS, supra note 70, at 149–51 (noting the collateral consequences of transnational
corporate prosecutions on certain third parties, such as investors).
84. GARRETT, supra note 74, at 223, 246 (noting that the United States is one of a few
countries with a broad standard for corporate criminal liability).
85. Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Turkey-U.S., June 7, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 9891.
86. See generally Devlin Barrett & Adam Entous, U.S. Not Persuaded to Extradite Imam
Over Turkey Coup, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2016, 8:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/u-s-not-persuaded-to-extradite-imam-over-turkey-coup-1470357556
[https://perma.cc/VZ2X-Q3C3].
87. Julian Borger, Ex-Trump Aide Flynn Investigated over Plot to Kidnap Turkish
Dissident–Report, GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2017, 12:49 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/nov/10/michael-flynn-trump-turkish-dissident-cleric-plot
[https://perma.cc/AXU9-6RTE] (noting that Flynn reportedly discussed with the Turkish
government the possibility of having Gülen kidnapped and sent to Turkey in exchange for
fifteen million dollars); Carol D. Leonnig et al., Giuliani Pressed Trump to Eject Muslim
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resorted to pressuring the United States to extradite Gülen by arresting U.S.
citizens in Turkey, such as NASA scientist Serkan Golge, who was detained
after an anonymous tip linked him to the 2016 coup attempt.88 American
officials, including President Trump, demanded Turkey release Golge from
solitary confinement, given the lack of incriminating evidence against him,
and eventually succeeded in securing his return to the United States in June
2020.89 Such foreign nations’ responses are often inevitable: every country
makes meaning of the world through a unique historical, linguistic, and
cultural frame.90 Given the multidimensional nature of this interpretive act,
a disjunct inevitably emerges when one country prosecutes a foreign national
and another nation interprets such action. This represents the critical tension
for criminal justice on the global stage: foreign perceptions of a politicized
“David and Goliath” case, wherein a lone foreign national is caught in the
gears of the omnivorous U.S. criminal justice machine. Foreign actors may
decry such action as wholly “political,” flattening U.S. government decisionmaking from the reality—one that is decentralized, multifaceted, and
complex91—to a caricature of a monolithic government actor with a singular
motivation. Globalization and technology hasten this dynamic. Through
both traditional and social media, foreign citizens can easily view, shortly
thereafter, the law enforcement action taken in another country, sparking
condemnation both from a foreign government and from its citizens.
II. THE PROMISE: A PRINCIPLED PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION
This part now explains what role U.S. ELEP should play in foreign
relations. Consider the following hypothetical. The White House is
considering the best option to curb Chinese theft of COVID-19 vaccine
research.92 What is the menu of policy options? According to orthodox
foreign relations strategy, one would likely default to the six foreign policy
modalities (again: diplomacy, cooperation agreements, trade, economic

Cleric from U.S., A Top Priority of Turkish President, Former Officials Say, WASH. POST (Oct.
15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/giuliani-pressed-trump-to-eject-muslimcleric-from-us-a-top-priority-of-turkish-president-former-officials-say/2019/10/15/bf43d1ecef68-11e9-b648-76bcf86eb67e_story.html [https://perma.cc/W7Q3-A8N5] (“Rudolph W.
Giuliani privately urged President Trump in 2017 to extradite a Turkish cleric living in exile
in the United States . . . .”).
88. Carlotta Gall, NASA Scientist Jailed in Turkey for 3 Years Recounts His Ordeal, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/world/europe/turkey-erdogannasa-scientist-golge.html [https://perma.cc/BN7Y-MQEE].
89. Id.
90. Steven Arrigg Koh, Polarization and The Criminal Trial 14 (June 4, 2021)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
91. In the most common scenario, the United States decides—collectively, through the
complex interaction between state and federal prosecutorial bodies, grand juries or judicial
charging, and domestic arrest or arrest abroad—to arrest and prosecute a foreign national.
92. See China Hackers Sought to Steal Coronavirus Vaccine Research, Says US,
GUARDIAN (July 21, 2020, 8:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/22/chinahackers-sought-to-steal-coronavirus-vaccine-research-says-us
[https://perma.cc/B7BH6QPB] [hereinafter China Hackers].
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sanctions, military force, and foreign aid).93 The staffer could advise the
president to diplomatically engage Chinese President Xi Jinping; more
coercively, wield the power of trade tariffs; or engage in individualized or
national economic sanctions. Adjacent to this set of policy options, however,
lies the U.S. criminal justice system. Perhaps the best approach is to let
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigators and DOJ prosecutors
open cases against individual Chinese nationals.
Thus, this part will identify the desirable comparative advantage of
criminal prosecution in the broader context of foreign policy options.
Domestic criminalization literature partially helps us answer this question.
Such scholarship clarifies criminal law as one available mode of regulation,
albeit one that may “crowd out” sensible forms of policy regulation.94
Indeed, scholars have criticized overcriminalization of public health policy,95
immigration policy,96 poverty,97 homelessness,98 and women’s health,99 not
to mention areas that should not be subject to regulation at all, such as race100

93. See Apodaca, supra note 3, at 2.
94. See SIMON, supra note 1, at 259–66 (discussing the mix of war and cancer metaphors
that have been applied to poverty, crime, and terrorism); see also supra note 1.
95. See, e.g., Zita Lazzarini et al., Criminalization of HIV Transmission and Exposure:
Research and Policy Agenda, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1350, 1350 (2013) (“More than half of
US jurisdictions have laws criminalizing knowing exposure to or transmission of HIV, yet
little evidence supports these laws’ effectiveness in reducing HIV incidence. These laws may
undermine prevention efforts outlined in the US National HIV/AIDS Strategy, in which the
United States has invested substantial federal funds.”); J. Kelly Strader, Criminalization as a
Policy Response to a Public Health Crisis, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 435, 435 (1994).
96. See, e.g., Rubén G. Rumbaut et al., Immigration and Crime and the Criminalization
of Immigration, in THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF MIGRATION STUDIES 472,
476 (Steven J. Gold & Stephanie J. Nawyn eds.); Liam Brennan, Sessions Is Criminalizing
Immigration Violations. That Upends Centuries of History., WASH. POST (May 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/05/10/sessions-iscriminalizing-immigration-violations-that-upends-centuries-of-history/
[https://perma.cc/T4PM-QHM9].
97. See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Criminalization of Poverty: Much More to Do, 69 DUKE
L.J. ONLINE 114, 114 (2020); Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 644–46 (2009) (mapping the criminalization of welfare).
98. See, e.g., ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN INT’L HUM. RTS. CLINIC, “FORCED INTO BREAKING
THE LAW”:
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN CONNECTICUT 2 (2016),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/schell/criminalization_of_homelessness_re
port_for_web_full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC6V-DSDC] (“Laws that restrict behaviors
in which people experiencing homelessness must engage to survive, as well as the practices
used to enforce these laws, constitute what this report refers to as ‘making homelessness a
crime’ or ‘the criminalization of homelessness.’”).
99. See, e.g., William Wan, Amid New Talk of Criminalizing Abortion, Research Shows
the Dangers of Making It Illegal for Women, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/04/05/amid-new-talk-ofcriminalizing-abortion-research-shows-dangers-for-women/ [https://perma.cc/5RKQ-6WCC]
(surveying recent state attempts to criminalize abortion).
100. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS, 6–12 (2012); Angela Y. Davis, Race and Criminalization: Black
Americans and the Punishment Industry, in THE HOUSE THAT RACE BUILT 264, 264–65
(Wahneema Lubiano ed., 1997) (discussing the structural character of racism in the U.S.
criminal justice system).
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and sexual orientation.101
Relatedly, scholars also bemoan
overcriminalization of drug possession, wherein draconian sentencing laws
have led to mass incarceration102 and, recently, triggered reform
proposals.103 But after offering its descriptive insight, criminalization
literature less often advances an affirmative case for what should be the
proper role of criminal justice. U.S. ELEP does not function in a vacuum; it
may be used instead of, or alongside, other foreign policy options. This
reality forces us to make an affirmative case for what criminal justice does
and does not best serve. And it provides a baseline from which to measure
the overcriminalization of foreign relations.
The U.S. government best engages U.S. ELEP in instances that engage
criminal justice’s distinctiveness and expressivism. Consider the former.
First, criminal justice is individualized: it targets foreign nationals one at a
time, as opposed to, for example, foreign aid.104 The question is always one
of individual criminal responsibility.105 Second, it is retrospective, an ex
post intervention in order to promote accountability for past actions, in
contrast to negotiations of prospective bilateral agreements. In criminal
cases, finders of fact determine what occurred, as opposed to prognosticating
101. See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers
v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1806–07 (1993) (criticizing a case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia “sodomy” law); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631, 643–46 (same).
102. See Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1388 (2018)
(“The U.S. criminal justice system is a colossus, its reach unprecedented by both global and
historical measures.”); Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and
Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962) (“One kind of systematic
nonenforcement by the police is produced by criminal statutes which seem deliberately to
over-criminalize, in the sense of encompassing conduct not the target of legislative concern,
in order to assure that suitable suspects will be prevented from escaping through legal
loopholes as the result of the inability of the prosecution to prove acts which bring the
defendants within the scope of the prohibited conduct.”).
103. See Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/senate-criminal-justicebill.html [https://perma.cc/5WP4-2JU5] (discussing the First Step Act).
104. To be clear, the basket of traits described below are what make U.S. ELEP distinctive.
Any individual trait is shared with at least one of the other modalities. For example, the trend
toward individualization exists regarding sanctions and drone strikes. See generally Elena
Chachko, Administrative National Security, 108 GEO. L.J. 1063 (2020). Furthermore, a
decision to prosecute an individual corporate officer may amount to prosecution of the
government itself in instances where the company itself is a public-private hybrid. Even when
a company is completely private, governments and the general public may perceive that
company as having quasi-citizen qualities. Cf. Kelly Couturier, How Europe Is Going After
Apple, Google and Other U.S. Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/13/technology/how-europe-is-going-after-ustech-giants.html [https://perma.cc/A7ZG-HD27]; Trump Slams EU Over $5 Billion Fine on
Google, REUTERS (July 19, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-googleantitrust-trump/trump-slams-eu-over-5-billion-fine-on-google-idUSKBN1K91YC
[https://perma.cc/PQ8L-SHH9] (describing criticism by President Trump of the European
Union’s fining of Google for antitrust violations).
105. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41223, FEDERAL CONSPIRACY LAW: A
BRIEF OVERVIEW 10–11 (2020); 109. Rico Charges, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-109-rico-charges
[https://perma.cc/K5NH-QNJW].
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what will occur in the future. Third, it involves a high degree of process. In
contrast to the six foreign policy modalities like military force, a criminal
case must wind through domestic criminal legal process—indictment by a
grand jury, review by judges, conviction, appeals, etc.—and sometimes
through transnational criminal legal process, such as extradition. Finally, it
results in incarceration or execution, meaning that it implicates the
deprivation of liberty. Such sanction is the ultimate hallmark of criminal
justice domestically. When compared to foreign policy, it is more overtly
punitive than diplomatic negotiations but less coercive than use of broader
military force.
The case of Joaquín Archivaldo Guzmán Loera (“El Chapo”) is
particularly illustrative of such distinctiveness. On January 19, 2017, the eve
of President Trump’s inauguration, Mexico extradited El Chapo to the United
States on charges of operating a continuing criminal enterprise and other
drug-related charges.106 El Chapo, a Mexican national and head of the
Sinaloa Cartel, had escaped from Mexican custody twice, leading the
Mexican government to decide to extradite him to the United States.107 In
February 2019, after a three-month trial, El Chapo was found guilty on all
counts.108 In sum, the case exemplifies U.S. ELEP at its best: the United
States deploying its criminal justice system to prosecute an individual,
nonstate actor wanted both in the United States and Mexico, who had
engaged in past criminal conduct that both governments could prove beyond
a reasonable doubt, thus warranting deprivation of liberty. By engaging in
prosecution in this manner, the United States was able to strengthen its
foreign relations with Mexico.
In addition to distinctiveness, U.S. ELEP harnesses criminal justice’s
expressivism. At its best, criminal justice expresses U.S. commitment to
accountability for serious crimes, adjudicated before a neutral branch of
government in adherence to a broader rule of law.109 Again, this insight
highlights a normative ambiguity: while criminal legal scholars rightly
criticize the pathologies of U.S. criminal justice, foreign relations and
international criminal legal scholars also correctly view criminal
prosecutions as, at times, preferable to more destructive and/or less
process-oriented foreign policy alternatives. This was a central argument in
the debates around the forum in which to prosecute Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, the architect of the 9/11 attacks. While the U.S. government
cared about holding him morally culpable and deterring his and others’
conduct,110 the critical debate regarding forum included expressive aspects:
either in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
106. Koh, supra note 6, at 350.
107. Id. at 350–51.
108. Id. at 351.
109. This differentiates U.S. ELEP from domestic criminal prosecutions, which may
express a collective judgment of retribution or deterrence.
110. Retribution and deterrence are of course integral to all criminal prosecutions. But the
expressiveness of the U.S. prosecution—projecting certain norms and values outside of the
U.S. borders—has a greater impact on U.S. foreign policy.
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(demonstrating America’s commitment to submitting even our most serious
foes to criminal process in Article III federal courts) or in special military
commissions in Guantanamo Bay (undermining such commitment).111 A
similar impulse contributed to the U.S.-led establishment of the Nuremberg
and Tokyo tribunals. Instead of summarily executing the Nazis or the
imperial Japanese, the United States expressed that it, in the words of
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, “stay the hand of vengeance” and
submit enemy combatants to “the judgment of the law,” constituting “one of
the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.”112
Similarly, the subsequent U.S.-backed113 international criminal tribunals—
like the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda—were
designed to express that individuals, not a whole people, were accountable
for atrocity crimes.114 As Professors David Luban and Antony Duff have
noted, international criminal trials are effective in norm projection: trials are
not “politics by other means” but instead constitute expressive acts that
telegraph to the world that mass atrocities are heinous crimes.115 U.S. ELEP
does the same, for example, by conveying that suspected terrorists prosecuted
in U.S. federal court should be held criminally responsible within our
systems of criminal law and procedure.116

111. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: THE RELENTLESS RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY AND SECRECY 87–88 (2015) (detailing the policy debates among the DOJ and the
State Department regarding venue in the case).
112. Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the U.S., Opening Statement Before the
International Military Tribunal (Nov. 21, 1945); Koh, supra note 15, at 527.
113. See Koh, supra note 15, at 528.
114. Vincenzo Militello, The Personal Nature of Individual Criminal Responsibility and
the ICC Statute, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 941, 944 (2007). For this reason, only 199 defendants
were tried at Nuremberg; the ICTY only indicted 161 people. About the ICTY, UNITED
NATIONS:
INT’L
CRIM.
TRIBUNAL
FOR
THE
FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA,
https://www.icty.org/en/about [https://perma.cc/WG4V-EAAJ] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021);
Nuremberg
Trials,
U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM (Jan.
5,
2018),
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-nuremberg-trials
[https://perma.cc/7M5R-V8UG]. But again, these numbers belie the expressive potential of
these cases, which targeted high-level offenders and sent a strong message of criminal
accountability globally.
115. See Antony Duff, Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 589, 593 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds.,
2010); David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of
International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 575–76
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010). In this way, international trials take on a
different valence than pure domestic criminal law, which emphasizes punishment. Duff,
supra, at 593; Luban, supra, at 575–76.
116. President Trump’s call to Ukranian President Volodymyr Zelensky occurred on July
25, 2019, also highlights the same effect but inverted: foreign criminal justice may impact
domestic U.S. policy. Ayesha Rascoe, Who Was on the Trump-Ukraine Call?, NPR (Nov. 7,
2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/07/775456663/who-was-on-the-trumpukraine-call [https://perma.cc/A7XE-6AE7]. In pressuring the Ukrainian president to
investigate Hunter Biden, President Trump knew that an international headline reading
“Hunter Biden Indicted in Kiev” would express something particularly wrongful about
Biden’s actions, regardless of the retribution or deterrence for Biden personally.
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To better apprehend the distinctive and expressive nature of U.S. ELEP,
this Article now answers the thought experiment described above regarding
Chinese theft of COVID-19 vaccine research.117 Such theory clarifies that
prosecution is particularly desirable if isolated individuals perpetrated the
theft but is less so if the theft is government-sponsored and systematic. Given
that prosecution is individualized, retrospective, and process-heavy and
results in incarceration, prosecution is best deployed if certain “lone wolves”
are stealing research. These individuals may be identified through federal
investigation and, if prosecuted, subjected to U.S. process that properly
distinguishes them from the Chinese government or Chinese people more
generally. Prosecution also expresses U.S. condemnation of such actions
globally, to dissuade other actors from engaging in such conduct. However,
if the theft is the product of a broader Chinese governmental enterprise of
intellectual property theft—as could be the case for both China and
Russia118—a few criminal cases are a drop in a much larger geopolitical
strategic bucket. The slow, individualized approach in criminal cases is
ill-suited to guard against a broader immediate Chinese geopolitical strategy
of vaccine-related intellectual property theft. And the expressiveness of such
cases is compromised, given it signals the blameworthiness of individuals
when the Chinese government is more properly responsible. In other words,
if such theft is in fact government-sponsored, then it recasts prosecution—
like the July 2020 indictment, in the Eastern District of Washington, of
Chinese nationals who hacked U.S. COVID-19 vaccine researchers119—as
wrongly occupying the lead in foreign relations when other foreign policy
tools, such as diplomacy, agreements, or sanctions,120 are more preferable to
curtail the Chinese government’s intervention.
This expressivism recasts commonly held scholarly conceptions of
criminal justice as a policy option. Professor George Fletcher once argued
that criminal law should serve as a power that the state wields as a last resort,
only when less drastic remedies have been exhausted.121 In a more realist
way, Professor Dan Richman has noted that fundamental constitutional rights
constitute “expensive appurtenances” that come along with criminal law,
meaning that it may constitute a less appealing option than others available
to the state; however, various institutional and political factors may combine
to make criminal prosecutions the “sweet spot” for both those favoring

117. China Hackers, supra note 92.
118. Julian E. Barnes & Michael Venutolo-Mantovani, Race for Coronavirus Vaccine Pits
Spy Against Spy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/
05/us/politics/coronavirus-vaccine-espionage.html [https://perma.cc/C6LB-6EKH].
119. Indictment at 1–4, United States v. Xiaoyu, No. 4:20-CR-6019 (E.D. Wash. July 7,
2020).
120. Cf. Julian E. Barnes, Russia Is Trying to Steal Virus Vaccine Data, Western Nations
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/us/politics/vaccinehacking-russia.html [https://perma.cc/ZV2P-CFB7]; Barnes, supra note 11.
121. George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
687, 700 (2000).
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maximal and those favoring minimal government action.122 In the domestic
context this makes sense, but in the foreign policy context it does not. When
alternatives to criminal prosecution include measures like military force,
criminal prosecutions function as a less coercive tool of foreign policy than
they do in domestic policy.
The sum of this distinctiveness and expressivism immediately conjures
three insights: one institutional, one normative, and one cautionary. The
institutional insight reveals an intra-executive tension. Foreign policy is a
bread-and-butter, executive-driven function that falls squarely within the
discretion of the U.S. president. Meanwhile, criminal law enforcement turns
on an autonomous U.S. DOJ that—while falling under presidential
appointees—is supposed to be largely free of political, and particularly
presidential, control.123 In this sense, it is beneficial for a president to
publicly affirm that he lacks the power to withdraw indictment in certain
cases: the United States is signaling to the world that it is prosecuting not
due to overt political antagonism but due to the considered, independent
determination of its prosecutors under a statutory framework previously laid
out by the political branches, affirming essential principles like notice and
legality. This is why, for example, in 2014, President Barack Obama publicly
resisted calls to end DOJ investigations into French bank BNP Paribas,
despite pressure from then-French President François Hollande to do so.124
It is also evident in the Meng case, when Prime Minister Trudeau—in
contrast to President Trump—stated that he could not interfere with the
extradition process playing out in Canadian courts.125 These are not hollow
statements but rather affirm the distinctiveness and expressivism of U.S.
criminal justice globally.
The normative insight is that U.S. ELEP may be positive for U.S. foreign
relations. At a high level of generality, all national governments have an
interest in promoting criminal accountability, and states working together to
promote criminal justice ends may be beneficial to both such governments
and their nationals.126 The FIFA case, for example, earned high praise
122. Daniel Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options: A Celebration of
Bill Stuntz, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES OF
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 64, 66 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012).
123. Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130
HARV. L. REV. 811, 823 (2017).
124. Karen Freifeld & Yann Le Guernigou, Obama Deflects French Pressure to Intervene
in BNP Dispute, REUTERS (June 5, 2014, 6:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-bnpparibas-usa/obama-deflects-french-pressure-to-intervene-in-bnp-disputeidUSKBN0EG15420140605 [https://perma.cc/K3WU-V62P].
125. Andy Blatchford, Trudeau Rejects Calls to End Huawei Exec’s Extradition to U.S.,
Even If It Would Free Jailed Canadians in China, POLITICO (June 25, 2020, 1:10 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/25/justin-trudeau-huawei-executive-extradition339851 [https://perma.cc/X6Z3-W86V]; see Young, supra note 38.
126. This may include two countries working together to prosecute a national of one of the
two countries. For example, Mexico wanted El Chapo—a Mexican national—extradited to
the United States for prosecution as much as the U.S. government did. See Joshua Partlow &
Matt Zapotosky, Mexican Drug Lord Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Extradited to U.S., WASH.
POST (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexican-drug-
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globally from nations around the world, which saw the United States as
holding accountable a deeply corrupt world soccer organization.127 Or, as
another example, the United States and China promoted their mutual interest
in combating the fentanyl scourge via the arrest of Liu Yong by Drug
Enforcement Agency officials in New Orleans, which in turn led to an
international investigation into Liu’s network of manufacturing and shipping
fentanyl to American users.128 And the joint investigations into the world’s
largest child pornography website,129 the Panama Papers,130 1Malaysia
Development Berhad,131 and the “Elder Fraud Sweep”132 were mutually
beneficial for all countries involved, promoting accountability for crimes,
such as the distribution of child pornography, willful failure to file a Report
of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), conspiracy to violate the
FCPA, and money laundering.
The cautionary insight returns us to the aforementioned global arrest game.
U.S. ELEP’s distinctive qualities characterize its limitations: it targets
individuals when broader state-oriented foreign policy engagement is more
appropriate, and it introduces autonomous actors—such as grand juries,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges—into a policy space better suited
lord-joaquin-el-chapo-guzman-extradited-to-us/2017/01/19/7e08ee38-de9a-11e6-918c99ede3c8cafa_story.html [https://perma.cc/CSW4-VNTM]. In the FCPA context, this has
been coined a “coordination rationale” and a “bolstering logic.” Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E.
Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 409, 410 (2014) (defining “coordination” as the concept that
actions of U.S. law enforcement are influenced by those of foreign regulators); Elizabeth
Acorn, Prosecutorial Imperialism or Pragmatism? 11 (May 27, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); see also GARRETT, supra note 74, at 246–47 (“Prosecutors
increasingly collaborate on international work, assisted by treaties cementing norms against
corruption and fraud.”).
127. See M.V., How America Is Pursuing FIFA, ECONOMIST (June 1, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2015/06/01/how-america-is-pursuingfifa [https://perma.cc/5P4M-525E]; Ben Wright, Fifa Is About to Learn a Stern Lesson About
the Vigour of American Prosecution, TELEGRAPH (May 27, 2015, 1:15 PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/international/11632230/Fifa-about-to-learn-astern-lesson-about-the-vigour-of-American-prosecution.html [https://perma.cc/4T3J-8M44].
128. Steven Lee Myers, China Sentences Man to Death for Trafficking Fentanyl to the U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/world/asia/china-fentanyldeath-penalty.html [ https://perma.cc/T83M-JJG4].
129. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., South Korean National and Hundreds of Others
Charged Worldwide in the Takedown of the Largest Darknet Child Pornography Website,
Which Was Funded by Bitcoin (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/south-korean-national-and-hundreds-others-charged-worldwide-takedown-largestdarknet-child [https://perma.cc/XNG2-KPK4].
130. See Panama Papers Q&A: What Is the Scandal About?, BBC NEWS (Apr. 6, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-35954224 [https://perma.cc/UQK3-57YT].
131. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., United States Reaches Settlement to Recover
More Than $700 Million in Assets Allegedly Traceable to Corruption Involving Malaysian
Sovereign Wealth Fund (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-statesreaches-settlement-recover-more-700-million-assets-allegedly-traceable
[https://perma.cc/TST2-UMSF].
132. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Coordinates Largest-Ever
Nationwide Elder Fraud Sweep (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-coordinates-largest-ever-nationwide-elder-fraud-sweep-0
[https://perma.cc/QG6G-TUGF].
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for wholly political direction. And the expressive quality of criminal justice
may be distorted given “tagging,” or the tendency of a given nation to attach
variegated interpretive meanings to U.S. criminal prosecutions. Some of the
highest-profile cases are replete with such examples of tagging. In the Meng
case, this was obvious when Meng Wanzhou’s father and Huawei’s founder,
Ren Zhengfei, initially stated his belief that “the legal systems of Canada and
the United States are open, just and fair, and [would] reach a just
conclusion.”133 However, in mid-February, Ren reversed course, calling the
charges against Meng “politically motivated.”134 And the case led to The
American Trap, a book written by a French national who was convicted for
an FCPA violation and who sensationally accuses the United States of “war”
on foreign companies.135 Heeding this cautionary note, this Article must thus
consider the twin forces propelling expansion of U.S. ELEP. This, in turn,
helps to prescribe reforms to assure its principled function in foreign
relations.
III. THE FEAR: EXTRATERRITORIAL EXPANSION IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION
Having described the reality and promise of U.S. ELEP, this Article now
probes the fear: Which forces may push U.S. ELEP past its distinctive and
expressive function, thus risking the overcriminalization of foreign relations?
Contemporary scholarship helpfully identifies the twin forces driving
contemporary criminalization.136
First, criminalization through
enforcement: prosecutors and law enforcement aggressively marshal
133. Raymond Zhong, Huawei Founder Slams U.S. Charges as ‘Politically Motivated,’
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/18/technology/huawei-renzhengfei-bbc.html [https://perma.cc/JRB5-8BPW].
134. Id.
135. Adam Taylor & Liu Yang, An Unlikely Winner in the China-U.S. Trade War? A
French Businessman’s Book About His Battle With the DOJ, WASH. POST (June 8, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/06/07/an-unlikely-winner-china-us-trade-warfrench-businessmans-book-about-his-battle-with-doj/ [https://perma.cc/5SSE-7FZ3].
See
generally FRÉDÉRIC PIERUCCI, THE AMERICAN TRAP: MY BATTLE TO EXPOSE AMERICA’S
SECRET ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST THE REST OF THE WORLD (2019). This also applies to the
U.S. inaction in cross-border cases. For example, the United States has been clear that it will
not extradite Fetullah Gülen because the evidence it has provided is not supported by probable
cause; nonetheless, both President Erdogan and the Turkish public see this as politically
motivated and obstructed by the Central Intelligence Agency. See Tim Arango & Ceylan
Yeginsu, Turks Can Agree on One Thing: U.S. Was Behind Failed Coup, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
2,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/world/europe/turkey-coup-erdoganfethullah-gulen-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/B95J-XUYG]; Barrett & Entous, supra
note 86.
136. A third—criminalization through adjudication—is explored more robustly in my
previous scholarship. See Koh, supra note 6, at 365–83. The judicial impulse for perpetrator
punishment also drives foreign affairs prosecutions. See id. at 369–70. One factor
exacerbating this effect may be the nationality of defendants in such cases. See id. at 349. As
is well known, minority defendants are disproportionately indicted, convicted, and sentenced
in U.S. criminal cases. See BUTLER, supra note 1, at 70. This is also likely in play in foreign
affairs prosecutions: not only are such defendants potentially ethnic minorities, but they are
also not even U.S. citizens. See Koh, supra note 6, at 349.
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existing criminal laws.137 The prosecutor’s office—as opposed to the
courtroom or the criminal code—is where criminal law is fully fleshed out,
particularly as new prosecutorial tools routinely become accepted parts of the
opaque prosecutorial arsenal.138
Second, criminalization through
legislation: the political branches ratchet up ever-higher levels of sanctions
for undesirable conduct, obviating the need for more thoughtful, considered
policymaking.139 Once such regulation tips into criminal enforcement, it
rarely moves back in the other direction.140
This part argues that such twin forces contribute to the growth of foreign
relations criminalization. And, in particular, it shows a third cause of such
expansionism: presidential politicization, under the guise of the president’s
foreign affairs authority.141
A. Prosecutorial and Legislative Criminalization
Most scholars view prosecutors as a primary driver of
overcriminalization.142 In this conception, our criminal justice system is too
vast because of unchecked prosecutorial authority.143 Virtually no positive
law governs how criminal justice must proceed institutionally because the
Constitution broadly delegates law enforcement policy to the executive
branch.144 The DOJ is part of the executive branch, and any new presidential
137. See, e.g., Strader, supra note 95, at 437–38.
138. Richman, supra note 122, at 71–77.
139. RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 22–27.
140. Id. Indeed, from the time of the United States’s founding to today, there has been an
increase from three federal crimes to over 4500, plus 300,000 regulations enforceable by
criminal sanctions. Id.; see also William N. Clark & Artem M. Joukov, The Criminalization
of America, 76 ALA. LAW. 225, 225 (2015).
141. See also Koh, supra note 6, at 362–72.
142. Cf. Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 172–73 (2019);
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117,
2125 (1998) (noting that “prosecutor[s] ha[ve] the unilateral authority to decide what to
investigate”).
143. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
505–07 (2001) (“The definition of crimes and defenses plays a different and much smaller
role in the allocation of criminal punishment than we usually suppose. In general, the role it
plays is to empower prosecutors, who are the criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.”);
VERDIER, supra note 75, at 23 (noting that scholars identify political accountability, personal
ambition, and a preference to advance the public interest as prosecutors’ primary motivations
and incentives).
144. RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 22–24. As a formal constitutional and
administrative law matter, enforcement is at the core of the president’s duty to “take Care”
that laws be faithfully executed, but “remarkably little analysis” exists regarding the
president’s role in enforcement. Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1031, 1033–34 (2013). By contrast, a great deal of attention has been devoted to
presidential regulatory activity. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2384 (2001) (asserting that presidential control over regulatory activity
in executive branch agencies complies with legal standards, fosters administrative
responsibility, and advances regulatory effectiveness). In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme
Court recognized that federal criminal prosecution is an executive function under Article II of
the Constitution. 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (“The Act thus gives the Executive a degree of
control over the power to initiate an investigation by the independent counsel. . . .
Notwithstanding the fact that the counsel is to some degree ‘independent’ and free from
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administration installs dozens of political appointees, confirmed by the
Senate.145 Otherwise, prosecutors are unrestrained in making investigative
and charging decisions; unlike civil law countries, prosecutors make
decisions regarding investigation and charging that are unchecked by the
judiciary or other authorities.146 One of many symptoms of such authority is
the rate of plea bargains, which is the result of approximately 90 to 95 percent
of all federal and state court matters.147
Applied to U.S. ELEP, prosecutors may also drive the criminalization of
foreign relations in two ways.148 First, the broad discretion that prosecutors
enjoy may lead to a disproportionate impact on people, particularly people of
color,149 lower-income individuals,150 and foreign nationals.151 This leads
to the “othering” of foreign defendants, which exploits the targeting of
foreign defendants in order to promote domestic solidarity.152 Second,
prosecutorial discretion may also drive the expansion of the scope of
substantive offenses and their sanctions. Prosecutors freely deploy a mix of
charges in a given case, some of which reflect ex ante political branch
consideration of foreign policy concerns but some of which do not. As I have
shown previously, the judiciary is particularly deferential to prosecutors in
foreign affairs prosecutions, construing statutes and rules to give more
executive extraterritorial authority.153 Other scholars have attributed the
executive supervision to a greater extent than other federal prosecutors, in our view these
features of the Act give the Executive Branch sufficient control over the independent counsel
to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.”). Similarly,
in United States v. Nixon, the Court did not rule on whether the president has the inherent
authority to direct a prosecutor to act, such as withdrawing a subpoena. See 418 U.S. 683, 702
(1974); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of
Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 21 (2018).
145. About
DOJ,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/about
[https://perma.cc/23BB-DXF2] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); About Nominations, U.S.
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Nominations.htm
[https://perma.cc/PDY7-8NW3] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
146. Note, Restoring Legitimacy: The Grand Jury as the Prosecutor’s Administrative
Agency, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1205, 1217 (2017).
147. Matt Clarke, Dramatic Increase in Percentage of Criminal Cases Being Plea
Bargained, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/
news/2013/jan/15/dramatic-increase-in-percentage-of-criminal-cases-being-plea-bargained/
[https://perma.cc/7LGZ-6TWP]; LINDSEY DEVERS, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING:
RESEARCH SUMMARY (2011), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/
document/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9AK-Y9KL].
148. See also VERDIER, supra note 75, at viii (“[T]he expanding role of U.S. criminal
prosecutors marks a fundamental shift in how international finance is overseen and
regulated.”).
149. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
152. See generally Steven Arrigg Koh, Othering Across Borders, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE
161, 165 (2021); see also Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1372
(1988) (“Racism helps create an illusion of unity through the oppositional force of a symbolic
‘other.’ The establishment of an ‘other’ creates a bond, a burgeoning common identity of all
non-stigmatized parties—whose identity and interests are defined in opposition to the other.”).
153. See Koh, supra note 6, at 365–72.
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expansion of global bank prosecutions,154 corporate prosecutions,155 and
FCPA cases156 to prosecutors. The most egregious example is the DOJ’s
aggressive position on the FCPA, wherein it maintains that it has jurisdiction
over any foreign transaction denominated in U.S. dollars.157
Criminalization literature also points to legislative criminalization as a
second causal factor.158 Like prosecutorial criminalization, this is due in part
to the fact that little positive law governs how criminal law or foreign policy
should evolve substantively. While the Constitution rigorously imposes
criminal procedural rights,159 it provides little guidance on substantive
criminal law, with the exception of certain offenses enumerated in Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution.160 As a result, Congress is free to use federal
criminal law creatively because much of federal criminal law is optional
(state criminal law exists alongside it), as long as it is formally tied to some
express constitutional grant of lawmaking power.161 And while much ink
has been spilled regarding Congress’s commerce power and, relatedly, the
growth of federal criminal law more generally, comparatively little has been
written on Congress’s foreign commerce clause power and general authority
to criminalize extraterritorial conduct.162 Given this, there exists “an
inexhaustible supply of criminal law in the United States—a supply largely
unrestrained by the Constitution.”163 The political question and justiciability
154. See, e.g., VERDIER, supra note 75, at 179.
155. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 74, at 218–22, 230.
156. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 70, at 11 (describing prosecutors as taking advantage of
broadly worded prohibitions in order to target cases of suspected bribery).
157. FCPA PROFESSOR, supra note 6 (describing how several FCPA enforcement actions
have alleged jurisdiction because the transactions were denominated in U.S. dollars).
158. See Richman, supra note 122, at 66 (“[T]he ‘revolution in criminal procedure’
spearheaded by the Warren Court gave state and federal legislators good reason to devise civil
avenues for attacking ‘what might be more plausibly classified as criminal conduct.’” (quoting
Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and The Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 780 (1997))); Stuntz, supra note 143, at 528, 532, 576.
159. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (providing that trials for all crimes in the United
States, except in the case of impeachment, shall be conducted before a jury); U.S. CONST.
amend. IV–VI (including the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, protection from
double jeopardy, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to trial by an impartial
jury).
160. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. To some degree this is no surprise: the Framers almost certainly
expected substantive criminal law to unfold at the state level, with narrow federal exceptions.
As Professors–Dan Richman and Bill Stuntz have noted, “our Constitution has a lot to say
about how criminal law should be enforced but little about what criminal law should be.”
Richman, supra note 122, at 68.
161. RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 24–25.
162. Id. at 64. Congress may also derive its authority to pass legislation regulating foreign
conduct from the Define and Punish Clause, as well as broad authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause to enact legislation to implement treaties. BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 67,
at 574.
163. Richman, supra note 122, at 71. Similarly, as noted above, scholars have hotly
debated how the Constitution gives foreign relations power to the president of the United
States; the Constitution says nothing about what foreign policy the president should undertake.
See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 233 (2001). Compare GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER 68
(1997), and EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 1787–1984, at 177 (1984) (Randall Bland et
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doctrines only underscore and reinforce this on separation-of-powers
grounds.164 Furthermore, each nation has the jurisdiction to prescribe the
laws—including those criminalizing extraterritorial conduct—based on the
principles of territory, nationality, passive personality, the protective
principle, and universality.165 As such, the positive legal framework is
sufficiently capacious to provide the United States with broad leeway to
engage in robust extraterritorial criminal law enforcement.
Since the modern codification of the federal criminal code in 1948, at least
140 extraterritorial statutes have been passed into law. The statutes break
down into the categories of: (1) special maritime & territorial jurisdiction;
(2) special aircraft jurisdiction; (3) treaty-related; and (4) others.166 Each of
these pieces of legislation is supported by a combination of political
branches’ incentives for criminalization and prosecutorial overreach—
including statements from legislators that the United States be “tough on
crime” abroad. The Mann Act167 is the best example here, given it has been
progressively amended to encompass human trafficking, child pornography,
and extraterritorial sexual misconduct.168 This is ongoing. As recently as
2015, senators sponsored a bill to allow for state prosecutors (in addition to
federal prosecutors) to be able to prosecute such offenses.169 In a statement
on the U.S. Senate floor, Senator Dan Sullivan declared that doing so would
“enable the resources and cooperation between state and federal prosecutors
to ensure all cases of human trafficking are pursued and victims have
justice.”170 Another general example of this view is Chapter 45 of Title 18
of the U.S. Code—containing the most explicit extraterritorial criminal
statutory language—which is entitled “Foreign Relations” and encompasses
crimes like possession of property in aid of a foreign government and
enlistment in foreign service.171 Additionally, a brief glance at the
al. eds., 5th ed. 1984), and Bruce Stein, Notes on Presidential Foreign Policy Powers: The
Framers’ Intent and the Early Years of the Republic, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 413, 511 (1982),
with ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF
LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 52–80 (1991), and Charles J. Cooper et al., What the
Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 165, 171 (1988), and Michael
D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 206–10
(1998). See also SIMON, supra note 1, at 45–46 (discussing how the DOJ has grown in
importance as U.S. presidents have become more invested in the crime control function).
164. BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 67, at 45–71.
165. See generally RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (AM. L.
INST. 2017).
166. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 42–51 (2016).
167. White-Slave Traffic Act, Pub. L. No. 61-277, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
168. See Michael Conant, Federalism, the Mann Act, and the Imperative to Decriminalize
Prostitution, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 99–100, 116–17 (1996).
169. See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 114(1), 129
Stat. 227, 241–42; Liz Ruskin, Sullivan Wins Amendment to Let States Prosecute Mann Act,
ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2015/04/22/sen-sullivanwins-amendment-to-let-states-prosecute-mann-act/ [https://perma.cc/DB5L-N7QK].
170. Ruskin, supra note 169.
171. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 951–970.
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highest-profile cases reveals that foreigners are indicted for fairly standard
offenses—mail, bank, and wire fraud; money laundering; and conspiracy.172
Meng and Huawei, for example, were indicted for specific violations of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act173 (IEEPA) but also on more
commonplace counts of bank fraud and wire fraud.174
B. Presidential Politicization
Criminalization literature does not always focus on the role of the president
of the United States, largely because the vast majority of criminal justice
occurs at the state or local level.175 But in the particular context of U.S.
ELEP, the president may also drive criminalization through presidential
politicization, given that the president may install pliant DOJ leadership
and/or personally direct criminal cases under the banner of diplomatic
authority. At the extreme, the president may violate a longstanding and
valuable norm of DOJ autonomy that, while not codified, is desirable both in
affirming prosecutorial process and in achieving better prosecutorial
outcomes.176
As a matter of positive law, the president has relatively free rein both in
foreign affairs and criminal prosecution. No formal law mandates how,
when, or in what manner the White House may interfere with the activities
of the DOJ and, in turn, the administration of criminal justice.177 Similarly,
the Constitution gives the president relatively free rein institutionally with
regard to foreign affairs—though scholars have hotly debated how the

172. See, e.g., Memorandum & Order Denying Severance, United States v. Hawit, No. 15cr-252 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017) (listing the charges against defendants to include
racketeering conspiracy, wire fraud, money laundering conspiracy, and money laundering);
Superseding Indictment, United States v. Halkbank, No. 15-cr-867 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2019)
(listing the charges against the defendant to include conspiracy to defraud the United States,
bank fraud, conspiracy to commit bank fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy to commit
money laundering); Sealed Indictment, United States v. Owens, No. 18-cr-693 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2018) (listing the charges against the defendants to include: conspiracy to defraud
the United States, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit tax evasion, wire
fraud, money laundering conspiracy, willful failure to file an FBAR, and false statements).
173. Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 50 U.S.C.).
174. Superseding Indictment, supra note 42 (listing the charges against defendants Meng
and Huawei to include: conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit bank fraud,
bank fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy to violate IEEPA,
violations of the IEEPA, money laundering conspiracy, and conspiracy to obstruct justice).
175. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 1, at 34–37 (discussing how the U.S. president and other
state and local executives drive the expansion of governance through crime).
176. The core norm is that presidents exercise policy control over the DOJ by appointing
political DOJ leadership but then refrain from personally involving themselves in specific
criminal investigations. SUSAN HENNESSEY & BENJAMIN WITTES, UNMAKING THE PRESIDENCY:
DONALD TRUMP’S WAR ON THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL OFFICE 178–79 (2020).
177. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 7, 9, 34, 65; HENNESSEY & WITTES, supra
note 176, at 174 (“The Justice Department has institutional defenses against [presidential
interference], but they are notably and perhaps surprisingly weaker and less formal”). This is
due to the fact that the Framers did not envision a robust federal government role in law
enforcement. RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 27.
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Constitution gives foreign relations power to the president.178 As a result,
presidential engagement with U.S. ELEP is a double-edged sword. On one
hand, the president may sagely table prosecution in the name of quieting
foreign relations turmoil. On the other hand, the president may politicize
prosecutorial decision-making.
To illustrate this, consider the following. Would it be proper for President
Joe Biden to walk into a trade negotiation with Chinese President Xi Jinping
and say, “if you do not stop stealing intellectual property (IP), I will direct
the DOJ to aggressively prosecute your nationals for IP theft”? Alternatively,
can he say, “if you stop stealing IP, I will order the DOJ to withdraw
indictments against many of your nationals”? Or finally, would it be proper
for him to say, “if you do not stop stealing IP, I will order the DOJ to find
any federal charge possible against any Chinese national and prosecute them
all”?
While the President Biden scenario is a hypothetical, President Trump’s
actions while in office exposed this perilous reality, evidenced by his
relationship with DOJ leadership.
President Trump consistently
demonstrated disrespect for DOJ autonomy by pressuring the DOJ and/or
firing its leadership. During the earliest days of his administration, he fired
Acting Attorney General Sally Yates for opposing the litigation of the
“Muslim ban,” which she believed was unlawful.179 He then fired FBI
Director James Comey over the Russia investigation, despite the FBI
director’s ten-year term and the FBI’s historical freedom from White House
interference.180 In 2018, President Trump fired Attorney General Jeff
Sessions, largely due to Sessions’s recusal from the Russia investigation.181
And in 2020, President Trump fired Geoffrey S. Berman, the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, whose office had prosecuted
and launched investigations into Trump and his allies.182 In their stead,
178. See supra note 164 and accompanying text; HENNESSEY & WITTES, supra note 176, at
232 (“Foreign policy is particularly vulnerable to the expressive presidency because it is where
the presidency is least constrained by and cumbersome regulatory schemes and where
bureaucratic processes are most easily waved away.”).
179. David Smith et al., Sally Yates Fired by Trump After Acting US Attorney General
Defied Travel Ban, GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2017, 7:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/jan/30/justice-department-trump-immigration-acting-attorney-general-sally-yates
[https://perma.cc/X3LW-4VME].
180. Ali Vitali & Corky Siemaszko, Trump Interview with Lester Holt: President Asked
Comey If He Was Under Investigation, NBC NEWS (May 11, 2017, 6:48 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-reveals-he-asked-comey-whether-he-wasunder-investigation-n757821 [https://perma.cc/J3P8-HA2B]; see Andrew Kent, Congress and
the Independence of Federal Law Enforcement, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1927, 1975, 1984
(2019); HENNESSEY & WITTES, supra note 176, at 55 (noting that President Trump’s campaign
against the norm of investigative and prosecutorial autonomy began with him summoning
former FBI Director James Comey to the White House and requesting a loyalty pledge).
181. HENNESSEY & WITTES, supra note 176, at 168; Peter Baker et al., Jeff Sessions Is
Forced Out as Attorney General as Trump Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/sessions-resigns.html
[https://perma.cc/X3US-SL4T].
182. Alan Feuer et al., Trump Fires U.S. Attorney in New York Who Investigated His Inner
Circle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/20/
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President Trump appointed DOJ officials with a diminished commitment to
DOJ autonomy. Attorney General William Barr is the most salient example,
having manifested a disregard for DOJ autonomy when failing to recuse
himself from overseeing the Russia investigation and eventually recasting the
Mueller report findings in his own public summary; suggesting that political
bias existed behind the initiation of the Mueller investigation; and defying a
congressional subpoena to explain the origin of the proposed citizenship
question on the 2020 Census.183
Additionally, President Trump’s
handpicked Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen—who was the head of
the DOJ until the beginning of the Biden administration—lacked any
prosecutorial experience whatsoever.184
Compromised DOJ leadership highlights a second, worrying aspect of
presidential politicization: White House control over the administration of
individual cases. While President Trump overtly called for the indictment of
President Obama and then-former Vice President Biden,185 the Roger Stone
case best exemplifies this fear. On February 10, 2020, prosecutors submitted
a sentencing memorandum recommending that Stone, who was a vocal
supporter of President Trump and who had been convicted of seven counts
of obstructing and lying to Congress as well as witness tampering, receive a
sentence within the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of seven to nine
years.186 In the early hours of February 11, 2020, President Trump expressed
his disapproval of the recommendation over Twitter, calling it “a horrible and
very unfair situation.”187 Later that day, shortly after a DOJ official told
reporters that the DOJ considered the recommendation “extreme and
excessive and grossly disproportionate,” the DOJ filed an amended
sentencing memorandum, which insisted that its previous recommendation
nyregion/trump-geoffrey-berman-fired-sdny.html
[https://perma.cc/B6GU-5UAB].
Although Attorney General William Barr released a statement that he had formally asked
Trump to remove Berman from his position, after Berman refused to resign, Trump claimed
that he was not involved in the decision. Jerry Lambe, Barr and Trump Can’t Get Their Stories
Straight About Who Wanted U.S. Attorney Geoffrey Berman Fired, LAW & CRIME (June 20,
2020, 7:14 PM), https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/barr-and-trump-cant-get-their-storiesstraight-about-who-wanted-u-s-attorney-geoffrey-berman-fired/
[https://perma.cc/FNR3ZV4B].
183. See Kyle Cheney, Dems Ratchet Up Pressure on Barr over Mueller Probe, POLITICO
(Apr. 4, 2019, 9:35 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/04/mueller-report-barrsummary-democrats-1255454 [https://perma.cc/L2J8-UMXF]; Nicholas Fandos, House
Holds Barr and Ross in Contempt over Census Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/us/politics/barr-ross-contempt-vote.html
[https://perma.cc/U2SF-HWXX].
184. Sarah N. Lynch & Andy Sullivan, U.S. Senate Confirms Jeffrey Rosen as No. 2 Justice
Department Official, REUTERS (May 16, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-senate-rosen-idUSKCN1SM2CS [https://perma.cc/SV4A-A2ZQ].
185. David E. Sanger, Taking Page from Authoritarians, Trump Turns Power of State
Against Political Rivals, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/
10/us/politics/trump-barr-pompeo.html [https://perma.cc/6BD5-CVVN].
186. Lucien Bruggeman & Soo Rin Kim, A Timeline of the Extraordinary Turn of Events
in the Roger Stone Case, ABC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2020, 10:21 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-extraordinary-turn-events-roger-stonecase/story?id=68921601 [https://perma.cc/X5NB-WBEJ].
187. Id.
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“would not be appropriate,” instead “defer[ring] to the court as to what
specific sentence is appropriate.”188 That same afternoon, all four
prosecutors responsible for the initial recommendation announced their
withdrawal from the case and, for one, from the DOJ entirely.189 Ultimately,
President Trump commuted Stone’s sentence, to widespread criticism.190 On
December 23, 2020, President Trump granted clemency to Roger Stone, as
well as two other close allies of the president.191
Applied to U.S. ELEP, this presidential direction of leadership and case
management leads to worrying results. Take the recent case of General
Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda, the former Mexican Secretary of National
Defense. On October 15, 2020, U.S. authorities arrested Cienfuegos at Los
Angeles International Airport on federal charges of money laundering and
conspiracy to manufacture, import, and distribute narcotics in the United
States.192 Then, in November 2020, the DOJ made an about-face, moving to
dismiss the indictment because “[t]he United States . . . determined that
sensitive and important foreign policy considerations outweigh the
government’s interest in pursuing the prosecution of the defendant . . . and
therefore require dismissal of the case.”193 Some public commentary rightly
called this an “eyebrow raiser”; U.S. District Judge Carol B. Amon, the
presiding judge over the case, felt similarly, calling the acting U.S. Attorney

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Peter Baker, In Commuting Stone’s Sentence, Trump Goes Where Nixon Would Not,
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/us/politics/trump-rogerstone-nixon.html [https://perma.cc/2D4G-LLD6]. In an interview on February 13, 2020,
Attorney General Barr remarked that although the president “has never asked me to to [sic]
anything in a criminal case,” “I think it’s time to stop the tweeting about Department of Justice
criminal cases,” which “make[s] it impossible for me to do my job.” Kevin Johnson, AG Barr:
Trump’s Tweets Make It ‘Impossible for Me To Do My Job’, USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2020,
9:20 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/02/13/ag-barr-presidenttrump-never-asked-me-do-anything-stone-case/4753732002/ [https://perma.cc/6V89-4UX7].
Stone eventually received a sentence of just over three years. Ashraf Khalil et al., Trump Ally
Roger Stone Sentenced to Over 3 Years in Prison, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://apnews.com/3f25972591780e9750d6fc17bcff506b [https://perma.cc/MS3C-X6MS].
Although President Trump denied interfering in the case, he asserted that he “would be able
to do it if [he] wanted” and that he has “the absolute right to do it.” Aaron Blake, Trump Just
Made the DOJ’s Roger Stone Intervention Look Even Worse, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/12/trump-implicates-barr-directlycontroversial-roger-stone-decision/ [https://perma.cc/4Z7M-F9A8].
191. Maggie Haberman & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Gives Clemency to More Allies,
Including Manafort, Stone and Charles Kushner, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/23/us/politics/trump-pardon-manafort-stone.html
[https://perma.cc/3R7H-WYLL].
192. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Joint Statement by Attorney General of the United
States William P. Barr and Fiscalía General of Mexico Alejandro Gertz Manero (Nov. 17,
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-statement-attorney-general-united-stateswilliam-p-barr-and-fiscal-general-mexico [https://perma.cc/E975-GM9H].
193. Michael S. Schmidt & Natalie Kitroeff, U.S. to Drop Case Against Mexican
Ex-Official to Allow Inquiry in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/world/americas/mexico-general-cienfuegos-case.html
[https://perma.cc/69H7-HBYW].
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to court to personally address why the DOJ had so moved. 194 Some
speculated that this change owes to President Trump “paying back” President
Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico, who had not recognized
then-President-elect Biden’s victory in the 2020 election.195 While the
United States has said it will cooperate with the Mexican prosecution of the
case, it is an open question whether the Mexican government even has
capacity to resolve such crimes.196 This case thus demonstrates the threat of
presidential politicization: the specter of direct White House case
management, delivered by pliant DOJ leadership.197
IV. THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN FOREIGN RELATIONS
This part proposes reforms to guard against the overcriminalization of
foreign relations and fortify U.S. ELEP’s distinctive and expressive
function.198 To do so, this part grapples with two long-standing normative
ambiguities. First, with regard to the executive, this part considers the
president’s role in criminal prosecutions. Second, with regard to the
legislature, this part considers the normative basis for criminalizing human
conduct. Ultimately, this part proposes three reforms: presidential
distancing, prosecutorial integration, and legislative de-escalation.
A. Executive Reforms: The White House, DOJ, and Line Prosecutor
Regarding the executive branch, the necessary structural reform requires
presidential distancing—thickening the layer between the White House and
DOJ and prosecutorial integration—thinning out the layer between Main
Justice and the United States Attorney’s Offices (USAOs).
As a threshold matter, the president’s role must be clarified in such cases.
Scholars have lightly touched on the nature and extent of DOJ autonomy as
part of a “classic debate” about the executive branch’s unitary nature.199 And
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (“Impunity rates are extraordinarily high for even common crimes—more than 90
percent of homicides go unsolved nationwide.”).
197. While, in this case, presidential involvement led to the cessation of criminal
prosecution, the broader point is the same: if the president has the ability to directly control
federal prosecutions, this ability is another essential factor when considering how foreign
relations may be criminalized. As noted above, a president who can easily call for the end of
a prosecution may easily call for the initiation of one.
198. Cf. PFAFF, supra note 4, at 216 (“The ultimate solution . . . is significant culture
change: a move away from insisting that the costs of crime consistently trump any costs
associated with enforcement, and away from an assumption that all crimes require a punitive
response.”).
199. The “classic debate” is between those arguing for a strongly “unitary” executive—in
which all executive power be vested in the president—and those who argue that the president
may only oversee agencies’ decision-making processes unless otherwise charged with
decision-making authority by Congress. See Andrias, supra note 144 at 1108–09; Steven G.
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE
L.J. 541, 594–96 (1994); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 123–24 (1994); Robert V. Percival, Presidential
Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963,
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scholars have focused less on presidential enforcement authority, despite its
centrality in the president’s constitutional duty to “take Care” that the laws
be faithfully executed.200
While such academic debates play out, the view shared by most in
government—including myself as a former federal prosecutor—is that three
layers of separation do and should exist between the White House and
DOJ.201 First, in practice, a norm has long existed of DOJ autonomy from
direct White House control.202 On the “front end,” a long-standing norm
exists against the president ordering a prosecution, reducing risk of
politicized prosecutions.203 On the “back end,” a norm prohibits the
president from ordering the cessation of an investigation or prosecution, for
similar reasons.204 Yet nowhere are these norms clearly defined.205 In
contrast to other agencies like the Federal Trade Commission and Federal
Election Commission (FEC),206 no legislation makes DOJ independent of the
966 (2001); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 579, 581 (1984). These questions arose with
particular urgency during Watergate. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 17–22.
200. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 144, at 1033–34 (“[S]cholars have extensively debated
presidential involvement in rulemaking, but they have undertaken remarkably little analysis
of the President’s role in agency enforcement.” (footnote omitted)); Rachel E. Barkow,
Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 805–06,
846–49 (2015) (“There is now a vigorous debate about where the President’s duty under the
Take Care Clause ends and legitimate enforcement discretion given limited resources
begins.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Shalev Roisman, Presidential Law, 105 MINN. L.
REV. 1269, 1292–93 (2021); Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV.
825, 845–55 (2019).
201. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 22 (“Attorney General nominees since
Watergate have endorsed the principle of prosecutorial independence from the President, and
Senators have regarded a commitment to independence from the President as an essential
qualification for the position. DOJ officials assume that prosecutorial decisions should not be
influenced by partisan political considerations that may motivate the White House. Internal
DOJ policy likewise presupposes that prosecutors should be independent.” (footnotes
omitted)).
202. Obama, supra note 123, at 823 (“[W]ithin the executive branch, the President’s direct
influence is subject to constraints designed to safeguard the fair enforcement of the law.”).
Attorney General nominees since Watergate have also endorsed this autonomy principle.
Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 19.
203. Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 16 (“But, presidents do not, as a general matter,
tell the FBI when to initiate or terminate particular investigations. Nor do they direct federal
prosecutors whether charges against an individual should be presented to the grand jury or
how pending charges should be prosecuted.”); Obama, supra note 123, at 823 (“For good
reason, particular criminal matters are not directed by the President personally but are handled
by career prosecutors and law enforcement officials who are dedicated to serving the public
and promoting public safety. The President does not and should not decide who or what to
investigate or prosecute or when an investigation or prosecution should happen.” (footnote
omitted)).
204. See, e.g., infra note 216 and accompanying text.
205. See HENNESSEY & WITTES, supra note 176, at 180–85 (describing various historical
U.S. presidential interventions in law enforcement policy and, in some instances, criminal
cases).
206. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58; Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz,
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769,
770–71 (2013) (surveying the enabling statutes of independent and executive agencies to
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president,207 leaving it to the DOJ and White House to delineate this line.208
Likewise, no federal statute ever explicitly authorized the president to make
decisions in federal criminal matters; it is Congress’s role to determine the
scope of the president’s authority over criminal justice, and Congress has
acquiesced in the norm of DOJ autonomy.209 A second layer of prosecutorial
autonomy insulates USAOs from Main Justice oversight in Washington,
D.C. As is now relatively well settled as an institutional matter,210 each of

demonstrate that there is no singular characteristic common to all independent agencies). Of
course, scholars have noted that no one structural component necessarily unites all
independent agencies. See id. at 770–71. Having said that, independent agencies do vary in
their degree of autonomy from presidential control. See id.
207. Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 37 (“[L]egislation does not explicitly make the
Attorney General and the DOJ independent of the President, as it has done with some other
executive agencies and officials.”).
208. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Attorney General for Heads of Department
Components, All United States Attorneys 1 (May 11, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/communications_with_the_white_house_and_
congress_2009.pdf/download [https://perma.cc/JN9L-AUPZ] (regulating the manner and
content of communications between the DOJ and the White House).
209. Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 4. In addition, scholars argue that DOJ autonomy
follows from prosecutors’ ethical obligations as lawyers, which would be compromised if the
president directed the DOJ to pursue matters based on the president’s political motivations.
Id. at 64. Further, they maintain that presidential control over prosecutorial decision-making
may lead to grave separation-of-powers concerns. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, May
Federal Prosecutors Take Direction from the President?, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1817, 1819
(2019). According to Professors Green and Roiphe, because courts depend on prosecutors to
provide them with reliable facts, an absence of DOJ autonomy implies an absence of judicial
independence. Id. at 1842. Of course, the White House does have some limited control over
prosecutorial priorities when a new administration installs its political appointees. For
example, when Loretta Lynch became Attorney General in 2015, she issued a memo
committing the DOJ to prosecuting individuals for certain corporate misconduct related to the
financial crisis. New Justice Dept. Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 9, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2015/09/09/us/politics/document-justice-dept-memo-on-corporate-wrongdoing.html
[https://perma.cc/9TSE-V8NY]. Note that it is unclear if this was solely her initiative, the
White House’s priority, or a mix of both. This represented a break from Attorney General
Holder and possibly represented an expression of President Obama’s priorities later in his
administration. As another example, the DOJ Civil Rights Division under the Bush
administration was less active in enforcement of employment or voting rights, triggering
criticism regarding politicization and lack of transparency. Andrias, supra note 144, at 1063.
The president may always fire DOJ political appointees and name new ones if he perceives
that the department is investigating and prosecuting in an undesirable manner. See Green &
Roiphe, supra note 144, at 4–5. And many of these cases are unfolding “in the shadow of”
political control. Political appointees know that they may be fired at any time due to their
actions. Alberto Gonzalez, Opinion, US Attorneys Must Serve at the Pleasure of the President,
HILL (Mar. 13,
2017, 6:20 PM),
https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/theadministration/323769-it-is-the-duty-of-us-attorneys-to-serve-at-the-pleasure
[https://perma.cc/X7PB-N7ST] (discussing the president’s “virtually unlimited authority and
discretion” to fire political appointees). At the same time, they also know that their positions
are “stickier” than others in a presidential administration, due to the norm of DOJ autonomy.
See id.
210. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 144, at 37 (“If the division of authority between the
Attorney General and subordinate DOJ lawyers is relatively settled, particularly to the
satisfaction of the DOJ and its lawyers, the division of authority between the President and the
Attorney General with regard to criminal prosecutions is not.”).
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the ninety-three USAOs constitutes a largely autonomous nerve center of
control for its given territorial jurisdiction. In the vast majority of cases,
USAOs make independent decisions regarding which cases to investigate
and prosecute, without any clearance by Main Justice. Such localized
discretion has been made possible, in part, by the steady growth of the federal
caseload.211 Moreover, the transformation of federal prosecution into a
largely administrative system in the latter part of the twentieth century,
facilitated by the rise of plea negotiations and the concomitant decline of
judicial oversight, has steadily expanded the role and authority of USAOs.212
Third and finally, individual line prosecutors—the front-line federal
prosecutors at the DOJ—maintain a large amount of discretion in individual
cases under their charge. Individual prosecutors are, for example, making a
large number of decisions regarding their dockets, including investigations,
plea agreements, and motion practice. Most often, prosecutors work under
the direction of a criminal division chief or deputy chief and also alongside a
variety of other teams. In general, Main Justice commits only few resources
to local USAO prosecutions, focusing instead on broad policy initiatives and
cases presenting “visible or controversial political questions.”213
This descriptive, three-layered picture undermines a tempting but incorrect
suspicion about DOJ prosecution: that it is politically directed “all the way
down.” In fact, prosecutorial decision-making falls into an ambiguous zone
that, while not immune from political control, is somewhat insulated from it.
This is desirable. Criminal prosecution must be largely independent to avoid
outright politicization, and yet it must be democratically responsive to the
broader electorate to ensure a just set of prosecutorial priorities. Applied to
U.S. ELEP, this means that U.S. criminal cases with foreign policy
ramifications are not always U.S. criminal cases with foreign policy
motivations and, more often than is recognized, the White House is in the
dark regarding extraterritorial criminal law enforcement.
The Meng case is a good example. Does the Canadian arrest of a
high-level Chinese business executive constitute an explicit White House
211. See Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6
OHIO ST. J. CRIM L. 369, 406 (2009).
212. See id. Once again, exceptions exist to this rule. Main Justice reserves certain subject
matter expertise on issues such as civil rights prosecutions, narcotics and dangerous drugs,
and computer crimes. See Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips [https://perma.cc/WF63-Q8N7] (last visited Sept. 17,
2021); Criminal Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/criminal-section
[https://perma.cc/5ZZL-WSGV] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Section (NDDS), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal/ndds
[https://perma.cc/H3VQ-D2W6] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). The Office of Enforcement
Operations must clear certain law enforcement measures, such as electronic and video
surveillance, witness protection, witness immunity requests, and attorney subpoenas. Office
of Enforcement Operations (OEO), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminaloeo [https://perma.cc/8KY2-J7SH] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); see also U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Just. Manual §§ 9-7.110, 9-2.112 (2020). And U.S. Attorneys—political appointees—govern
the administration of cases within a given USAO. Beale, supra note 211, at 406.
213. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the
Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 201 (2008).
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attempt to leverage the U.S. criminal justice system in order to gain an
advantage in bilateral trade negotiations? It is a tempting theory, given
contemporary U.S. policy toward China. The Trump administration
perceived China as a geopolitical threat and has engaged in a trade war as
retribution for, among other things, its alleged theft of intellectual
property.214 But both President Trump and Prime Minister Trudeau stated
that they had no advance knowledge of the arrest, and this is likely true:
under standard norms of prosecutorial autonomy and standard procedure in
federal extradition cases,215 prosecutors are under no obligation to and do not
inform the chief executive of imminent arrests.216
This laudable, triple-layered DOJ autonomy clarifies why presidential
politicization is so problematic: it unsettles the mixed political-apolitical
nature of prosecutorial decision-making. Professors Bruce A. Green and
Rebecca Roiphe have advanced a “hypothetical foreign-policy scenario” in
which the president directs DOJ attorneys to make decisions in a criminal
case.217 Unfortunately, this scenario is no longer so hypothetical. While
Canada maintained that Meng’s arrest was apolitical, Trump further
politicized the arrest, saying that “he would intervene if that would help
secure a good trade deal with China,”218 against the advice of his top
advisers.219
1. Presidential Distancing
Presidential politicization accommodates the distinctiveness of U.S. ELEP
but undermines its expressive potential. On one hand, presidential control of
DOJ prosecutions means, in theory, a better opportunity for a president to
deploy criminal prosecution judiciously, balancing it against other foreign
policy tools and priorities. At the same time, however, the unfortunate reality
is that, under the direct political control of the White House, the expressivism
of criminal prosecutions is severely compromised.
This compromised expressivism deleteriously affects other U.S. law
enforcement activity and triggers the burgeoning global arrest game. For
214. A Quick Guide to the US-China Trade War, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45899310 [https://perma.cc/A5M5-X8NX].
215. As will be seen infra, such traditional norms were increasingly imperiled during the
Trump administration.
216. Memorandum, supra note 208. And though President Trump initially claimed that he
might intervene to release Meng, his administration later walked back this claim. Vivian
Salama & Sadie Gurman, Trump Aides Warn Him Against Intervening in Huawei Case, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2018, 10:32 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-aides-warn-himagainst-intervening-in-huawei-case-11544710475 [https://perma.cc/QDC2-JC27]. Indeed,
from Trump’s perspective, the case arose at an inopportune diplomatic time, just after a
seeming détente between the United States and China in their trade dispute. See, e.g., Steven
Arrigg Koh, The Huawei Arrest: How It Likely Happened and What Comes Next, JUST SEC.
(Dec.
10,
2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/61799/huawei-arrest-happened/
[https://perma.cc/6VZH-X3FD].
217. Green & Roiphe, supra note 209, at 1834.
218. See In A Row Between China and America, supra note 43.
219. Salama & Gurman, supra note 216.
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example, in September 2019, a Spanish court took the highly unusual step of
denying a U.S. request for the extradition of Hugo Carvajal, former
intelligence chief of Venezuela.220 The Spanish court ruled that the charges
against Carvajal were too “abstract” and, worryingly, tagged the case as
“within the American political strategy toward Venezuela.”221 The Spanish
appellate division later reversed—ruling in favor of the Spanish government
and the U.S. request for extradition.222 However, by the time the court
rendered its decision, Carvajal had been released from detention.223 He has
since gone missing, though he is allegedly in talks with the United States
about surrendering since being indicted alongside President Maduro.224
Thus, presidential distancing is required so that the president may not
directly order or otherwise interfere with foreign affairs prosecutions. The
most permanent means of assuring this is the most intuitive: the political
branches could pass legislation to insulate the DOJ in its prosecutorial
mission. A classic proposal, at times echoed by other scholars and mooted
especially in the wake of Watergate, is that the DOJ be converted into an
independent agency, wherein the Attorney General may act highly
autonomously and only be removed “for cause.”225 In February 2020,
Professor Cass Sunstein publicly revived this proposal in the mainstream
press.226 However, this proposal has three critical flaws. First and most
importantly, this legislative option is likely foreclosed due to the Supreme
Court’s 2020 decision in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau,227 which held it unconstitutional for an independent agency to have
one single director who the president may only remove “for cause.”228
220. Raphael Minder, Spanish Court Calls U.S. Extradition Request Politically Motivated,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
17,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/
world/americas/spain-venezuela-extradition.html [https://perma.cc/T5PU-3C8F].
221. Id.
222. See Raphael Minder, Venezuela’s Ex-Spy Chief, Wanted in U.S., Is Missing in Spain,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/13/world/europe/venezuelaspain-hugo-carvajal.html [https://perma.cc/3CXX-WLCB].
223. See id.
224. See id.; see also Ex-Venezuelan Spy Chief Hugo Carvajal May Surrender to U.S.,
JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/29/world/crimelegal-world/venezuela-spy-chief-hugo-carvajal-surrender-us/ [https://perma.cc/KF73-EZT5].
225. Ervin Says Justice Agency Should Be Independent Unit, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 1973),
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/13/archives/ervin-says-justice-agency-should-beindependent-unit.html [https://perma.cc/N2C4-JRFJ]. Such division is common at the state
level, where many state attorneys general are independent of the governor. See William P.
Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?: Governors, State Attorneys General and Lessons from
the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2453–61 (2006). Forty-eight states have some
variation on this structure. Id.
226. See Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, Imagine That Donald Trump Has Almost No Control
over Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/
opinion/sunday/trump-barr-justice-department.html [https://perma.cc/H6NS-DJPC].
227. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
228. Id. at 2197–99. Previously, the Court had recognized that executive power may be
severed from presidential control, and Professor Sunstein’s proposal was written based on that
assumption. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 665–68 (1988) (declining to hold that a
president possesses complete executive power, including federal prosecutorial power); Green
& Roiphe, supra note 144, at 30.
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Second—assuming a narrow reading of Seila Law—DOJ leadership could be
converted from a lone attorney general into a group of commissioners,
similar to the way in which the FEC is structured.229 While such a change
would arguably pass constitutional muster, it represents such a dramatic
institutional reform that it necessitates tremendous additional scholarly
analysis before implementation.230 Third, DOJ-related legislation is
politically unlikely due to contemporary political gridlock in Washington,
D.C.231
Given these unlikely statutory prospects, this section now turns to more
achievable intra-executive reforms. The Biden administration must publicly
commit itself to greater transparency regarding its norms of DOJ autonomy,
as then-Attorney General Eric Holder did in his 2009 memorandum on White
House communication and as the Bush administration ultimately did in a
2007 memorandum in the wake of the firing of Attorney General Alberto
Gonzalez—but as the Trump administration failed to do.232 Such an explicit
policy affirms that such norms are, and have always been, integral to
229. By contrast, a broad reading of Seila Law would prohibit independent agencies
altogether, reaffirming a unitary executive from a constitutional perspective. See Leah Litman,
The Supreme Court Chips Away at the CFPB’s Independence, SLATE (June 29, 2020, 12:01
PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/supreme-court-seila-law-v-cfpb.html
[https://perma.cc/YJY5-NUT4]. This is an open question, going forward, for the Supreme
Court.
230. Both history and institutional design suggest that such a change would be dramatic.
The attorney general role was established by the Judiciary Act of 1789—the same early,
landmark legislation that established the U.S. federal judiciary—and has led the DOJ since
1870.
About
the
Office,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
(Mar.
12,
20121),
https://www.justice.gov/ag/about-office [https://perma.cc/M8CR-6DLM].
While such
history by no means prohibits meaningful institutional reform, it begs numerous questions:
How would the commissioners be selected? What would their incentives be, and how would
such incentives differ from that of a singular attorney general?
231. It is possible that both parties will find persuasive the argument for greater DOJ
independence. The Republican Party is currently concerned with allegations that President
Obama directed the FBI to “spy” on the Trump campaign in 2016 using wiretaps and
informants. See Arit John, From Birtherism to ‘Treason’: Trump’s False Allegations Against
Obama, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2020, 10:37 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/
story/2020-06-23/trump-obamagate-birtherism-false-allegations
[https://perma.cc/QN9LMM6F]. Meanwhile, the Democrats, for example, were concerned with President Trump’s
involvement in the Roger Stone and Michael Flynn cases discussed earlier. Jordain Carney,
Democrats Ask for Investigation of DOJ Decisions to Drop Flynn Case, HILL (May 8, 2020,
2:04 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/496831-democrats-ask-for-investigation-ofdoj-decision-to-drop-flynn-case [https://perma.cc/5UGP-4LGS]; see also supra Parts I.B.1,
III.B (analyzing the Michael Flynn and Roger Stone cases, respectively).
232. As noted above, President Obama largely upheld the norm, while the Bush
administration controversy regarding the firing of seven U.S. Attorneys led to recognition that
a president acts illegitimately when he fires such appointees “midstream” during a presidential
term. See Memorandum, supra note 208, at 1; Memorandum from the Attorney General for
Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys 1 (Dec. 19, 2007),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2008/04/15/ag-121907.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CGJ9-R6NZ]. The only guidance from the Trump administration regarding
White House-DOJ contact was a memorandum to White House staff in 2017. See
Memorandum from Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the President, to All White House Staff
(Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015a-dde8-d23c-a7ff-dfef4d530000
[https://perma.cc/N5CM-VFX9].
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presidential and executive structure.233 This public standard not only
fortifies autonomy between the White House and DOJ but also bolsters the
integrity of individual USAOs and AUSAs. The ethical rules and norms
regulating prosecutors’ professional conduct, such as disinterestedness, are
vital to preserving their function before the judiciary; presidential
involvement in criminal prosecutions impedes such function.234 Importantly,
when prosecutors are pressured to violate certain norms, they may withdraw
from the cases or resign.235
This policy also finds the sweet spot wherein the president does not control
criminal cases “all the way down” but is still apprised of forthcoming
criminal cases. The president can still install political appointees to lead the
DOJ. Even the most independent agencies—think the Federal Reserve or
National Labor Relations Board—rightly have a political nexus to
installation of leadership that share presidential priorities.236 But at the same
time, political appointees’ general guidance regarding overall prosecutorial
priorities does not mean presidential or even political appointee control of
granular case management. Such appointees could still alert the White House
about imminent arrests. As noted above, it is very likely that both President
Trump and Prime Minister Trudeau were unaware of Meng’s arrest in
Canada. While this is appropriate, it is also similarly appropriate for the DOJ
to alert the president about certain law enforcement activities.237

233. See generally Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV.
2187 (2018).
234. Green & Roiphe, supra note 209, at 1845.
235. A recent example involves Aaron Zelinsky, a prosecutor in the Roger Stone case.
Zelinsky withdrew from the case and then testified before the House Judiciary Committee on
political interference. See Felicia Sonmez et al., Prosecutor Testifies on Alleged Politicization
Inside
Barr’s
Justice
Department,
WASH.
POST
(June
24,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/06/24/barr-roger-stone-muellerdoj/ [https://perma.cc/BVE3-Q9VS].
236. For example, the Obama administration’s shift to deprioritizing the prosecution of
nonviolent drug offenders was widely praised as an appropriate method to counteract mass
incarceration. Obama, supra note 123, at 823–25; Andrias, supra note 144, at 1066–67. But
see David Cole, Why Hasn’t Obama’s Clemency Initiative Helped More Nonviolent Drug
Offenders?, NEW YORKER (July 4, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/whyhasnt-obamas-clemency-initiative-helped-more-nonviolent-drug-offenders
[https://perma.cc/8REP-ATDL].
237. See Memorandum, supra note 208, at 1 (stating that limited disclosure to the White
House is appropriate in circumstances involving national security matters and criminal or civil
investigations or cases that implicate the president’s duties). Furthermore, the State
Department’s involvement is “baked into” the extradition statutory regime itself: the
Secretary of State is the one who must ultimately sign off on the extradition package and send
it through diplomatic channels to another country. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Again, in the context
of Meng’s case, this means that diplomats are ultimately aware of law enforcement activity
abroad. Time will tell whether this process constitutes a “back door” to White House control
of foreign law enforcement activity abroad. Nonetheless, the State Department should not be
completely removed from foreign law enforcement activity. Extradition has a hybrid nature
and thus necessitates both DOJ and State Department involvement in order to safeguard both
law enforcement diplomatic priorities.
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2. Prosecutorial Integration
A more autonomous DOJ still presents the problem of prosecutorial
overcriminalization. In other words, the fact that the United States has a
stronger, brighter institutional line between criminal justice and foreign
policy does not immunize against the pathologies of too much substantive
criminal law and related enforcement. Greater insulation of the DOJ upholds
prosecutorial integrity, and thus expressivism, abroad but simultaneously
opens the door to the aforementioned clumsy prosecutorial decision-making
that may undermine distinctiveness. The necessary structural reform is
prosecutorial integration—i.e., thinning out the layer between Main Justice
and the USAOs. Until now, the mainstream prosecutorial attitude has been,
in a sense: “we’re going to enforce the law and if it creates foreign policy
issues, then so be it.” DOJ must attend to this collective institutional
perception.
At the second layer—the space between Main Justice in Washington, D.C.,
and the USAOs—prosecutorial integration requires that Main Justice be clear
on foreign affairs prosecutions. Main Justice is part of the National Security
Council, is engaged on a daily basis with the Legal Adviser’s Office at the
State Department (specifically the Office of Law Enforcement and Security),
and is comparatively more hardwired into the executive-branch-wide
coordination around international affairs.238 Such procedures would not be
as much of a power grab as they may seem. Routinely, various law
enforcement techniques and prosecutorial decisions are made by Main
Justice due to their sensitive nature. For example, the Office of Enforcement
Operations must clear wiretaps, video surveillance, and other forms of
federal electronic surveillance.239 Specifically, every one of the ninety-three
offices should develop a more robust expertise around international issues,
given that, as the Obama administration’s DOJ Criminal Division head once
stated, international and cyber offenses constitute the two most critical
emerging fronts in federal criminal justice today.240 To do so, it should
bolster the knowledge and function of the national and international security
coordinators in each USAO. Such coordinators—AUSAs trained by the
Office of International Affairs in the Criminal Division of Main Justice in
238. Office of the Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/bureaus-and-offices-reporting-directly-to-thesecretary/office-of-the-legal-adviser/office-of-the-legal-adviser-for-law-enforcement-andintelligence/ [https://perma.cc/CK3F-N2UF] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). Such coordination
already happens in an ad hoc fashion and will not be a matter of State Department clearance
as much as it is coordination. Koh, supra note 6, at 391.
239. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-7.000 (2020).
240. See Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Remarks at the CCIPS-CSIS
Cybercrime Symposium 2016: Cooperation and Electronic Evidence Gathering Across
Borders (June 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslier-caldwell-speaks-ccips-csis-cybercrime-symposium-2016 [https://perma.cc/9GJG-UQN5]
(“[T]wo emerging challenges to public safety and national security [are] the challenge posed
when criminals use new technologies to victimize innocent people and avoid accountability
[and] when criminal schemes cross international borders and legitimate law enforcement
efforts . . . require international cooperation to be successful.”).
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transnational and international issues arising in U.S. federal criminal
prosecution—currently serve as the initial point of contact for every USAO
“on matters relating to foreign relations, intelligence, and national
defense.”241 Their expertise and connection to Main Justice should be
strengthened through a more concerted DOJ-wide effort to coordinate the
investigation, charging, and prosecution of cases with international
dimensions.242
At the third layer, the AUSAs themselves, prosecutorial integration
requires that DOJ charging policy be amended to include a consideration of
foreign consequences, alongside the other traditional factors that govern
when to charge a defendant for an offense. As discussed earlier, criminal
justice is expressive, but the expressive benefits of criminal justice are
compromised when the U.S. criminal system clumsily projects itself abroad,
triggering tagging and fostering the global arrest game.243 Prosecutorial
decision-making must grapple with this reality; it is poised to do so given
capacious prosecutorial discretion.244 As of now, the Justice Manual entry
on initiation of prosecution—the authoritative DOJ-wide guidance on
whether and how to charge an individual with a crime—lists as one of its
nine factors “federal law enforcement priorities, including any federal law
enforcement initiatives or operations aimed at accomplishing those
priorities.”245 The DOJ’s guidance should be amended to include language,
such as: “the effects of such prosecutions on federal interests and foreign
relations.” Such additional guidance increases the likelihood that USAOs
and AUSAs will consider the broader communicative dynamics of their
decision-making in foreign relations. Such an amendment is very plausible;
the Justice Manual already recognizes that charging decisions may vary when
another jurisdiction, including a foreign jurisdiction, is already subjecting a
person to foreign prosecution.246 The Justice Manual also recognizes special
policy concerns around corporate prosecution.247
B. Legislative Reform: Legislative De-escalation & the Search for
Normative Foundations
Moving from the executive to the legislative branch, the third necessary
reform is for the political branches to engage in legislative de-escalation, or
the ratcheting down of criminal sanctions for certain criminal conduct. To
do so, the branches should not engage in a relative approach, claiming merely
241. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-90.050 (2020).
242. See id.
243. See supra Part II.
244. See generally Bellin, supra note 142, at 176–81.
245. U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’ys Manual § 9-27.230 (2020).
246. Id. § 9-27.240.
247. Id. § 9-28.400 (“[C]orporate conduct, particularly that of national and multi-national
corporations, necessarily intersects with federal economic, tax, and criminal law enforcement
policies. In applying these Principles, prosecutors must consider the practices and policies of
the appropriate Division of the Department and must comply with those policies to the extent
required by the facts presented.”).
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“we need fewer extraterritorial criminal statutes.” A more rigorous, effective
path is a principled one stating that “extraterritorial criminal statutes are only
appropriate for certain types of undesirable human conduct.” Thus, this
section grapples with the following question: What human conduct should
be criminalized? Given the vast scope of this topic, this section presents a
few different approaches, accounting for the development of research in this
area. Scholars can be divided into two broad schools of thought: the
mainstream realist school and the nascent normative school.
The realist school dominates as the governing paradigm in criminal legal
scholarship. According to this approach, U.S. criminal law evolved to be
only “what criminal justice actors did, nothing more.”248 From this
perspective, there has been a “creep” of criminalization since the nation’s
founding and particularly over the last few decades.249 As Professors Dan
Richman and Bill Stuntz have persuasively argued, no principled line has
animated substantive criminalization; instead, our current political moment
is one wherein legislators have publicly positioned themselves to voters as
“tough” on crime250 and wherein judicial articulation of greater criminal
procedural protection has triggered an expansive criminal legislative
response.251 The realist school rightly observes that a rigorous principle for
criminalizing conduct would readily guard against overcriminalization, given
that it would “anchor our decisions about when criminal sanctions should be
used as a tool of government power at the border between ‘mere’ regulation
and prosecution.”252 The realist school also recognizes that a failure to
articulate a viable account of criminalization has led to “intellectual chaos,”
due in part to the Anglo-American conflation of law and police power.253 In
fact, it recognizes that “[t]he absence of a viable account of criminalization
constitutes the single most glaring failure of penal theory as it has developed
on both sides of the Atlantic.”254 However, the realist school acknowledges
the reality that no principle can be drawn at the dividing lines between civil

248. See Richman, supra note 122, at 69. This is due to the relative weakness of the U.S.
state and the lack of institutional and regulatory actors beyond police, prosecutors, and judges.
Id.
249. See Richman, supra note 122, at 69–71 (recounting the growth of criminal law as a
form of regulation since the founding of the republic); see also Darryl K. Brown, Yick Wo
and the Constitutional Regulation of Criminal Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1405, 1407 (same).
Of course, just in the last few years, our “current political moment” may have evolved to be
more self-reflective about criminal justice reform, though much work still needs to be done.
See, e.g., FIRST STEP Act, H.R. 5682, 115th Cong. (2018).
250. Stuntz, supra note 143, at 510 (describing the political economy of
overcriminalization); Jain, supra note 102, at 1391 (surveying the political and legislative
barriers to criminal justice reform).
251. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997) (“As courts have raised the cost of criminal
investigation and prosecution, legislatures have sought out devices to reduce those costs.”).
252. Richman, supra note 122, at 67.
253. Id. at 67 (citing MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2005)).
254. HUSAK, supra note 1, at 58.
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and criminal sanction, nor in those between federal, state, and local criminal
justice.255
The smaller, normative school agrees with this realist portrait of the U.S.
criminal justice system’s exponential growth. But it goes a step further in
asking the following question: As a normative matter, what should be the
principle for criminalizing human conduct? The normative school observes
that this question is rarely asked and is thus largely unanswered because the
starting point for criminal theory is instead the justification of punishment.256
As a result, every first-year law student is introduced to criminal law through
its philosophical justifications: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, and others.257 But such classic questions turn on justifications
for the nature of criminal punishment and say less about what conduct should
trigger such punishment.
Fortunately, the normative school has spawned a recent “flurry” of
scholarship on the question of criminalization.258 Scholars such as
Professors Michael Moore and Douglas Husak have considered this question
in the past, while Professors Antony Duff and Joshua Kleinfeld have
provided a strong reconstructivist take on this question.259 Promising work
is also being done on the development of a normative core for international
255. As Professor Dan Richman has recognized, it is troubling when a society
over-criminalizes and over-punishes, though the metric for both is unspecified. Richman,
supra note 122, at 66.
256. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW xix (2000) (“[Criminal law’s]
central question is justifying the use of the state’s coercive power against free and autonomous
persons.”); Duff, supra note 115, at 593 (“[T]he ‘foundational question about criminal law is
what justifies punishment.’”) (quoting Luban, supra note 115, at 575)); Joshua Kleinfeld,
Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1497
(2016); Michael S. Moore, A Theory of Criminal Law Theories, 10 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 115,
140 (1990) (“The first question of a theory of the criminal law is the question of why we
punish.”). This likely stems from the mainstream scholarly view of criminal law’s definition,
which is defined not in terms of substantive offenses but in terms of its sanction, the
deprivation of liberty. Id. at 134 (“Such a view finds criminal law’s essence in a feature of its
[structure]—namely, in its remedy.”).
257. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 33–91 (8th ed. 2019); SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, RACHEL
E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 40–106 (10th ed.
2016); JENS DAVID OHLIN, CRIMINAL LAW: DOCTRINE, APPLICATION, AND PRACTICE 25–55
(2d ed. 2018).
258. Kleinfeld, supra note 256, at 1501. Very few scholars tackled these questions
previously. For example, Henry Hart once asserted that the purposes of criminal law are one
of multivalued rather than single-valued thinking. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 401 (1958). Additionally, what distinguishes a crime
from a civil wrong may be thought of as conduct triggering “a formal and solemn
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.” Id. at 405.
259. See, e.g., ANTONY DUFF ET AL., THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TRUTH AND DUE PROCESS 3
(2007); THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010); THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2013); CRIMINALIZATION: THE
POLITICAL MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2014); THE STRUCTURES
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2011); Kleinfeld, supra note 256, at 1501. See
generally R.A Duff, Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 125 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011); R.A. Duff,
Towards a Modest Legal Moralism, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 217 (2014).
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crimes.260 But it is “striking . . . how late this interest comes in the
maturation of the field and how small it is relative to the massive attention
given to punishment.”261 Indeed, “the theory of criminal wrongdoing is a
pinprick relative to the theory of punishment.”262
How do the realist and normative schools apply to U.S. ELEP? The realist
school undoubtedly helps us apprehend the descriptive picture of rising
criminalization of foreign relations.263 But the normative school potentially
arms us with tools to prescribe principled legislative reform.
While a full exposition of such theories is beyond the scope of this Article,
let us briefly consider two related theories of criminalization as examples of
what this project might look like.264 First, one may focus on Professor Duff’s
theory of crimes as moral wrongs that concern the public—all members of a
given polity—by virtue of their shared membership.265 In his conception, a
court may legitimately try a defendant if the alleged conduct is the proper
concern of the political community to which the defendant belongs and, thus,
the members to whom he must answer for violations of shared public
values.266 Relatedly, Professor Kleinfeld asserts a reconstructivist account
of criminal law, which serves a distinctive role by reconstructing the moral
basis of its social order in the wake of an attack on its ethical life.267 From
his viewpoint, crime is a communicative attack on social solidarity, and
prosecution is normative reconstruction.268 Professor Duff and Kleinfeld’s
theories would thus encourage us not to ask whether punishment of foreign
nationals for certain conduct serves retributive ends justifying punishment
based on moral desert.269 Instead, their theories might encourage us to focus
on the moral wrongs that have infringed upon the relevant political and moral
community and thus whether the expressive value of the prosecution of such
conduct themselves may repair the broken ethical life of such community.
Therefore, the central question—whether in domestic, transnational, or
international criminal law—would be identifying the relevant public to
whom the defendant is answerable. For instance, when the U.S. criminalizes
and then prosecutes five Chinese hackers for computer hacking, economic
espionage, and other offenses directed at U.S. corporations, the U.S. polity
260. See generally, e.g., Ryan Liss, Crimes Against the Sovereign Order: Rethinking
International Criminal Justice, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 727 (2019).
261. Kleinfeld, supra note 256, at 1501–02; see also HUSAK, supra note 1, at 58–60 (“[T]he
lack of scholarly interest in the topic of criminalization [is] baffling . . . . [N]o contemporary
theorist in the United States or Great Britain is closely associated with a theory of
criminalization.”).
262. Kleinfeld, supra note 256, at 1502.
263. See supra Part III.
264. For a discussion of how the works of Kleinfeld and Duff interrelate, see Kleinfeld,
supra note 256, at 1501 n.40 (“There is no question that Duff is in the reconstructive family.”).
265. Duff, supra note 115, at 595; Liss, supra note 260, at 743.
266. Duff, supra note 115, at 596.
267. Kleinfeld, supra note 256, at 1489.
268. Id. at 1488–97.
269. Id. at 1533 (“Reconstructivism makes unusually central use of expressivism’s insight
that punishment carries expressive properties, and indeed extends it: not only is punishment
expressive, but crime is too.”).
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presumably perceives this to be a wrong. But Professors Duff and Kleinfeld
potentially help us to better see that U.S. ELEP is communicative not just for
the American public but for the Chinese public; after all, the reconstructivist
would say that the focus of criminalization is ultimately on ordinary people,
not on the person being punished.270
In doing so, then, the criminalization of certain conduct may make a U.S.
community whole but may at the same time infringe upon foreign policy and,
thus, tear at foreign relations. Prosecution is inherently alienating,271
especially from a transnational perspective. Most of the time, a foreign
nation’s citizenry will identify with a fellow national whom the U.S. is
prosecuting. Given this identification, U.S. ELEP can express to the foreign
nation an imperialist America weaponizing its criminal justice system for
political ends. For both Professors Duff and Kleinfeld, criminalization,
prosecution, and punishment should be communicative, such as negating the
message of the human conduct.272 In this sense, U.S. ELEP’s effect is the
opposite of what Duff has argued for: the prosecution appears not as a
legitimate act of criminalization and prosecution by a political community,
but instead as a hollow, instrumental demand that the individual be punished.
Another way of phrasing this is from a Kleinfeldian perspective: to say that
the United States has a shared moral culture is one thing; it is much harder to
find a shared moral culture globally.273 This is possibly why the Meng case
unfolded the way it did. From a U.S. political community’s perspective,
defiance of U.S.-government-mandated sanctions represents a violation of
our collective order, leading to indictment in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York and subsequent steps to apprehend Meng in
Canada. And yet the communicative aspect of this prosecution broke down
in China, leading to retaliatory Chinese government action.274
Would this mean that the United States should not criminalize or prosecute
certain extraterritorial conduct out of fear of being badly viewed abroad? No.
But what it does mean is that the architecture of legislation animating U.S.
ELEP should be deliberately designed and then implemented. If one believes
that the “pathological politics” of criminal law are already impeding the
democratic and thus reconstructivist aims of criminal justice domestically,
then one must attend to the effects of the problematic communicative aspects
of such prosecutions abroad.
Thus, legislative de-escalation could mean that the U.S. political branches
narrow the universe of extraterritorial offenses to the most serious human
conduct, crimes that will likely not be as “lost in translation” when
communicated globally. For example, Congress has given tremendous
guidance regarding the extraterritoriality of child pornography statutes,
270. Id. at 1516.
271. Id. at 1494–95; Koh, supra note 90.
272. Kleinfeld, supra note 256, at 1504, 1525 n.112; R.A. Duff, Punishment,
Communication, and Community, in STUDIES IN CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 79 (Michael Tonry
& Norval Morris eds., 2000).
273. Id. at 1501–04.
274. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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which address inherently cross-border and cyber-related issues. Specifically,
one of the statutes criminalizes individuals who are “outside the United
States.”275 This legislation is proper, since it criminalizes conduct that is
universally condemned; this legislation, therefore, minimizes the risk of
foreign relations complications. On August 9, 2018, South Korean national
Jong Woo Son was indicted by a federal grand jury in the federal district
court for the District of Columbia for operating the world’s largest darknet
site for child sexual exploitation—with no foreign relations pushback.276 On
the other hand, the broadly construed conspiracy to defraud the United States,
as was charged in the Meng case, is more amorphous both substantively and
as a mode of liability; it is more likely to be perceived as a posture of
American protectionism.
The political branches could also cabin the specific cases for which
individuals may be extradited from abroad. A modern innovation in
extradition law has been a “dual criminality” requirement, wherein an
offense is extraditable so long as it is criminally codified in both the United
States and in a foreign country.277 The dual criminality standard is desirable
because it allows criminal justice systems to stay aligned over time. But such
treaties also have a gravity threshold—typically one year of imprisonment—
necessary to trigger the extradition process.278 The gravity threshold could
be increased to five or more years.
But this is just a sketch of what a reimagined statutory framework would
look like. So much in this space turns on the underlying normative theory of
criminalization and should be a focus of further research. A harm-based
conception of criminalization, for example, could lead not to an emphasis on
the communicative aspects of an offense but instead on the harm perpetrated
domestically regardless of the international communicative ramifications.
Future research must develop such normative foundations and then apply
them to U.S. ELEP.

275. 18 U.S.C. § 2260(b).
276. Press Release, supra note 129. Son was also charged and convicted in South Korea
and recently completing an eighteen-month sentence in April for running the child
pornography site. Choe Sang-Hun, South Korea Denies U.S. Request to Extradite Operator of
Child Pornography Site, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/07/06/world/asia/south-korea-child-pornography-extradition.html
[https://perma.cc/TR2S-VP53]. On July 6, 2020, the Seoul High Court rejected the DOJ’s
extradition request for Son, stating that having him in South Korea was critical to the country’s
efforts to track down users of the site. Id. The court’s decision drew significant backlash from
South Korean anti-child pornography groups that had anticipated Son’s extradition to the
United States as a rebuke of sexual crimes in South Korea. Id.
277. RONALD J. HEDGES, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES 20–22
(2017), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/International-Extradition-Guide-HedgesFJC-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWK4-2HLG].
278. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, U.K.-U.S., art. 2(1), Mar. 31,
2003, T.I.A.S. No. 07-426 (defining an extraditable offense as one punishable by a year or
more of imprisonment); Extradition Treaty with the Philippines, Phil.-U.S., art. 2(1), Nov. 13,
1994, T.I.A.S. No. 96-1122 (same).
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CONCLUSION
U.S. criminal justice today stretches beyond our borders and risks
overcriminalizing our foreign relations.
The two forces driving
criminalization at home—overzealous prosecutors and overinclusive
legislators—are combining with overreaching presidential authority to
propel U.S. law enforcement abroad. This Article calls for a principled role
for U.S. extraterritorial law enforcement policy, one that upholds its
distinctiveness and expressivism compared to six other foreign policy
modalities. Presidential distancing and prosecutorial integration will help the
president, DOJ, and individual attorneys uphold these comparative
advantages, while a richer normative theory of criminalization may facilitate
the necessary legislative de-escalation.

